Tag: Opinion

  • Opinion | These French Riots Are Different — and Far More Disturbing

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    This time, the riots followed the point-blank police shooting of 17-year-old Nahel Merzouk after a car chase. The cost of the riots in a mere week — over $1 billion in damages to businesses — towers above that of 2005, but perhaps more notable is that the discussion of the banlieues has receded, or is mediated through, the lens of the police. (In fact, this echoes a different French film, Ladj Ly’s 2019 crime thriller Les Miserables; the last prophetic image is of a young boy beside himself with trauma and anger brandishing a Molotov cocktail in the face of a cop with a gun.) Today the majority of rioters don’t have an immigrant background, and most of them are minors, some as young as 12 — in other words only a few years younger than the victim. It is their extreme youth combined with what has been characterized as their hyper violence that makes headlines.

    The images we see are shocking, yes. There’s almost a one-upmanship on social media that pits three burnt busses against one gutted city hall (and I’ll raise you two looted McDonald’s). The scale of the destruction is breathtaking; it’s frequently symbolic, but often merely opportunistic — and sometimes downright incomprehensible in its perversity, like the assaults on the medical personnel trying to put some of these kids back together.

    But today, despite all that is dystopian in these scenes of enraged children driven to trash their very own environment, almost everyone gets it. Few are actually surprised.

    This is why 2023 is different from 2005. Regardless of the mindlessness of some of the destruction, the young people rampaging across French cities and towns are also expressing a deep anger rooted in humiliation that is felt across the country, not just in the banlieues. You could argue that for many French people, regardless of where they live, the nature of governance and decision-making in the past few years means that they all feel like “riff-raff” now.

    What’s important to remember is that Macron’s governance is not incompetent — far from it. In comparison to the manner in which other major advanced democracies handled Covid, the energy crisis or inflation, France has done quite well. The trouble is that the people — the French rather than France — feel like they keep drawing the short straw when it comes to their voices and preferences being taken into account, their political and civic rights respected, their humanity protected.

    From the often violent repression of the gilets jaunes (yellow vest movement) and Macron’s broken promises of a changed governing style, to the ramming through of pension reform (without a vote) in the face of massive, violent protests, the current government, despite its technocratic prowess, has given nearly every segment of French society, across all demographics and regions, cause to feel that they are governed sometimes competently but almost always with humiliating impunity. And too many have been injured or killed by police in the process; statistics show that French police kill four times more today than they did in 2010, fueling cycles of protest and repression.

    That’s not to diminish the hardship and injustice faced far too often by some in French society rather than others. But the reality is, the oxygen behind these waves of increasingly frequent and increasingly violent displays is in part the fact that everyone in France has had at least a small taste of the humiliation that many have endured for decades — aside from those whose thirst for an order based exclusively on exaction and punishment drives them to the harder edges of the right.

    In these early days of summer 2023, what floats above the smoldering remains of the riots, is the shared sense across French society that their problems are being systematically exacerbated by the actions of the police — and by those of a judiciary that tends to criminalize the victims and treat their families with disdain. It is an irony that this is what may finally provide a shared point of reference across French towns, communities, classes and creeds: That enough is enough and that root-and-branch police reform is not only necessary but urgent after decades of combined neglect and empowerment. But instead, as already pointed out by some, France has systematically passed legislation to further arm the police year after year over the last two decades.

    The cycle of violence, from police and rioters, is taking place in a fragmented political landscape that is only going to get tougher to navigate. The riots are driving the right and far-right closer together — a tendency that is present across many European democracies and that will have profound consequences for next year’s European Parliament elections. But they also create pressures on a deeply-divided left — torn between their desires for social justice and the demands of a base that is increasingly receptive to the far-right’s promises of order.

    Macron must confront this dilemma or risk making injustice and humiliation the exclusive drivers of French politics — an outcome that will only lead to further destruction and potentially catastrophic results in the presidential election of 2027.

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    ( With inputs from : www.politico.com )

  • Opinion | Ukraine Needs a Roadmap to NATO Membership ASAP

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    lithuania russia ukraine war 66556

    This means taking steps to ensure that Ukraine 1) wins this war and reestablishes full control over its internationally recognized 1991 borders; and 2) is fully anchored in the security and economic arrangements that from 1945 until 2014 made Europe a continent of peace, prosperity and cooperation. The transatlantic community can only be stable and secure if Ukraine is secure. Ukraine’s entry into NATO, fulfilling the promise made at the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, would achieve that.

    In Vilnius, NATO heads of state and government should offer an unequivocal statement of alliance support for Ukraine and for Kyiv’s aim of regaining sovereignty and territorial integrity within its 1991 borders. They should further underscore their readiness to supply Ukraine weapons — including longer-range missiles such as ATACMS, Western fighter planes and tanks — in sufficient quantities to prevail on the battlefield. This will demonstrate the allies’ unequivocal commitment to Ukrainian victory and send a clear message to Moscow that its military situation in Ukraine will only grow worse the longer the conflict continues.

    In Vilnius, the alliance should launch a roadmap that will lead clearly to Ukraine’s membership in NATO at the earliest achievable date. As with Finland and Sweden, the process can bypass the Membership Action Plan in light of the close and ongoing interactions between NATO and Ukraine. NATO heads of state and government should task the Council in permanent session to develop recommendations on the timing and modalities of an accession process for Ukraine for decision at the next NATO summit in Washington in 2024.

    To enhance Ukraine’s security until it joins NATO, NATO and Ukraine at Vilnius should establish a deterrence and defense partnership under which:

    · the allies will provide all necessary arms, training, equipment, and intelligence and other support to deter or defeat ongoing and new aggression by Russia; and

    · Ukraine will continue to carry out essential steps to expedite its integration into the alliance and its command structures.

    At the Vilnius summit, the allies and Ukraine should upgrade the NATO-Ukraine Commission to a NATO-Ukraine Council. The Council will oversee the deterrence and defense partnership and serve as a crisis consultation mechanism — in the spirit of Article 4 of the Washington Treaty — in the event of a threat to the territorial integrity, sovereignty, or security of Ukraine or any of the NATO member states.

    In Vilnius, the allies should reaffirm their commitment to enhance coordinated measures to meet Ukraine’s urgent needs for military and defense equipment, focusing directly on air defense systems, long-range missiles and necessary ammunition, tanks and advanced combat aircraft.

    To expand practical assistance to Ukraine, the allies should invite Ukraine to assign additional liaison officers at NATO headquarters and commands to support the launch of a joint process of developing a Ukrainian long-term national security strategy, national defense strategy, and national defense posture compatible with NATO standards and planning.

    The allies should also approve the updated Comprehensive Assistance Package to facilitate Ukraine attaining full interoperability with NATO forces and making a comprehensive transition to NATO standards. The focus should be on the transition to Western weapons systems; creation of a modern, NATO-compatible air and missile defense system; creation of a medical rehabilitation system for wounded soldiers, as well as a system for soldier reintegration into civilian life and a comprehensive demining effort.

    Vilnius can be a historic NATO summit. The above steps would bring closer NATO membership for Ukraine and, with it, the elimination of gray zones and ambiguous security situations that have proven to be an invitation to aggression. The result would be a more stable, secure, and prosperous transatlantic community.

    Signed:

    Stephen E. Biegun
    Former U.S. deputy secretary of state

    Hans Binnendijk
    Former director for defense policy and arms control at the National Security Council; distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council

    Stephen Blank
    Senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute

    Gen. Philip Breedlove (ret.)
    U.S. Air Force, 17th Supreme Allied Commander Europe; distinguished professor at the Sam Nunn School, Georgia Institute of Technology

    Ian Brzezinski
    Former deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO Policy; senior fellow at the Atlantic Council

    Dora Chomiak
    Chief executive officer at Razom for Ukraine

    Gen. Wesley Clark (ret.)
    U.S. Army, 12th Supreme Allied Commander, Europe; senior fellow at the UCLA Burkle Center

    Luke Coffey
    Senior fellow at the Hudson Institute

    Andrew D’Anieri
    Assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center

    Larry Diamond
    Senior fellow at the Hoover Institution; senior fellow at Stanford University

    Amb. Paula Dobriansky
    Former under secretary of state for global affairs

    Amb. Eric S. Edelman
    Former under secretary of defense for policy 2005-2009

    Evelyn Farkas
    Executive director of the McCain Institute; former deputy assistant secretary of defense for Russia, Ukraine, Eurasia

    Daniel Fata
    Former deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO; senior advisor, Center for Strategic and International Studies

    Amb. Daniel Fried
    Former assistant secretary of state for Europe and Eurasia; former U.S. ambassador to Poland

    Francis Fukuyama
    Senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University

    Melinda Haring
    Nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center

    Amb. John Herbst
    Former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine; senior director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center

    Maj. General William C. Hix (ret.)
    U.S. Army

    Lieut. Gen. Ben Hodges (ret.)
    Former commanding general, U.S. Army Europe

    Donald N. Jensen
    Adjunct professor at the Krieger School of Arts and Sciences, Johns Hopkins University

    Andrea Kendall-Taylor
    Former Deputy National Intelligence Officer for Russia and Eurasia

    Amb. John Kornblum
    Former U.S. ambassador to Germany

    David Kramer
    Former U.S. assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights, and labor; executive director at the George W. Bush Institute

    Franklin Kramer
    Distinguished fellow and board director at the Atlantic Council; former assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs

    Matthew Kroenig
    Vice president and senior director at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

    Jan M. Lodal
    Distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council

    Lieut. Gen. Doug Lute (ret.)
    Former U.S. Army; former U.S. ambassador to NATO 2013-17

    Jane Holl Lute
    Former deputy secretary of homeland security

    Shelby Magid
    Deputy director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center

    Tom Malinowski
    Former U.S. member of Congress; senior fellow at the McCain Institute

    Nadia McConnell
    President of the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation

    Robert McConnell
    Co-founder of the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation; director of external relations at the Friends of Ukraine Network

    Amb. Michael McFaul
    Former U.S. Ambassador to Russia; director at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University

    Amb. P. Michael McKinley
    Former U.S. ambassador to Peru, Colombia, Afghanistan, and Brazil

    Amb. Carlos Pascual
    Former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine

    Amb. Steven Pifer
    Former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine

    Amb. Stephen Sestanovich
    Former U.S. ambassador-at-large for the former Soviet Union 1997-2001; senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations; professor at Columbia University

    Amb. Andras Simonyi
    Former Hungarian ambassador to NATO; nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council

    Angela Stent
    Nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution

    Amb. William B. Taylor
    Former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine

    Amb. Alexander Vershbow
    Distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council; former NATO deputy secretary general; former U.S. ambassador to Russia and South Korea

    Amb. Melanne Verveer
    Former U.S. ambassador-at-large for Global Women’s Issues; executive director at the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security

    Alexander Vindman
    Lieutenant Colonel (ret.), U.S. Army

    Amb. Kurt Volker
    Former U.S. ambassador to NATO; former U.S. special representative for Ukraine negotiations

    Amb. Marie Yovanovitch
    Former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine

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    #Opinion #Ukraine #Roadmap #NATO #Membership #ASAP
    ( With inputs from : www.politico.com )

  • Opinion | We Need a Manhattan Project for AI Safety

    Opinion | We Need a Manhattan Project for AI Safety

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    At the heart of the threat is what’s called the “alignment problem” — the idea that a powerful computer brain might no longer be aligned with the best interests of human beings. Unlike fairness, or job loss, there aren’t obvious policy solutions to alignment. It’s a highly technical problem that some experts fear may never be solvable. But the government does have a role to play in confronting massive, uncertain problems like this. In fact, it may be the most important role it can play on AI: to fund a research project on the scale it deserves.

    There’s a successful precedent for this: The Manhattan Project was one of the most ambitious technological undertakings of the 20th century. At its peak, 129,000 people worked on the project at sites across the United States and Canada. They were trying to solve a problem that was critical to national security, and which nobody was sure could be solved: how to harness nuclear power to build a weapon.

    Some eight decades later, the need has arisen for a government research project that matches the original Manhattan Project’s scale and urgency. In some ways the goal is exactly the opposite of the first Manhattan Project, which opened the door to previously unimaginable destruction. This time, the goal must be to prevent unimaginable destruction, as well as merely difficult-to-anticipate destruction.

    The threat is real

    Don’t just take it from me. Expert opinion only differs over whether the risks from AI are unprecedentedly large or literally existential.

    Even the scientists who set the groundwork for today’s AI models are sounding the alarm. Most recently, the “Godfather of AI” himself, Geoffrey Hinton, quit his post at Google to call attention to the risks AI poses to humanity.

    That may sound like science fiction, but it’s a reality that is rushing toward us faster than almost anyone anticipated. Today, progress in AI is measured in days and weeks, not months and years.

    As little as two years ago, the forecasting platform Metaculus put the likely arrival of “weak” artificial general intelligence — a unified system that can compete with the typical college-educated human on most tasks — sometime around the year 2040.

    Now forecasters anticipate AGI will arrive in 2026. “Strong” AGIs with robotic capabilities that match or surpass most humans are forecasted to emerge just five years later. With the ability to automate AI research itself, the next milestone would be a superintelligence with unfathomable power.

    Don’t count on the normal channels of government to save us from that.

    Policymakers cannot afford a drawn-out interagency process or notice and comment period to prepare for what’s coming. On the contrary, making the most of AI’s tremendous upside while heading off catastrophe will require our government to stop taking a backseat role and act with a nimbleness not seen in generations. Hence the need for a new Manhattan Project.

    The research agenda is clear

    “A Manhattan Project for X” is one of those clichés of American politics that seldom merits the hype. AI is the rare exception. Ensuring AGI develops safely and for the betterment of humanity will require public investment into focused research, high levels of public and private coordination and a leader with the tenacity of General Leslie Groves — the project’s infamous overseer, whose aggressive, top-down leadership style mirrored that of a modern tech CEO.

    I’m not the only person to suggest it: AI thinker Gary Marcus and the legendary computer scientist Judea Pearl recently endorsed the idea as well, at least informally. But what exactly would that look like in practice?

    Fortunately, we already know quite a bit about the problem and can sketch out the tools we need to tackle it.

    One issue is that large neural networks like GPT-4 — the “generative AIs” that are causing the most concern right now — are mostly a black box, with reasoning processes we can’t yet fully understand or control. But with the right setup, researchers can in principle run experiments that uncover particular circuits hidden within the billions of connections. This is known as “mechanistic interpretability” research, and it’s the closest thing we have to neuroscience for artificial brains.

    Unfortunately, the field is still young, and far behind in its understanding of how current models do what they do. The ability to run experiments on large, unrestricted models is mostly reserved for researchers within the major AI companies. The dearth of opportunities in mechanistic interpretability and alignment research is a classic public goods problem. Training large AI models costs millions of dollars in cloud computing services, especially if one iterates through different configurations. The private AI labs are thus hesitant to burn capital on training models with no commercial purpose. Government-funded data centers, in contrast, would be under no obligation to return value to shareholders, and could provide free computing resources to thousands of potential researchers with ideas to contribute.

    The government could also ensure research proceeds in relative safety — and provide a central connection for experts to share their knowledge.

    With all that in mind, a Manhattan Project for AI safety should have at least 5 core functions:

    1. It would serve a coordination role, pulling together the leadership of the top AI companies — OpenAI and its chief competitors, Anthropic and Google DeepMind — to disclose their plans in confidence, develop shared safety protocols and forestall the present arms-race dynamic.

    2. It would draw on their talent and expertise to accelerate the construction of government-owned data centers managed under the highest security, including an “air gap,” a deliberate disconnection from outside networks, ensuring that future, more powerful AIs are unable to escape onto the open internet. Such facilities would likely be overseen by the Department of Energy’s Artificial Intelligence and Technology Office, given its existing mission to accelerate the demonstration of trustworthy AI.

    3. It would compel the participating companies to collaborate on safety and alignment research, and require models that pose safety risks to be trained and extensively tested in secure facilities.

    4. It would provide public testbeds for academic researchers and other external scientists to study the innards of large models like GPT-4, greatly building on existing initiatives like the National AI Research Resource and helping to grow the nascent field of AI interpretability.

    5. And it would provide a cloud platform for training advanced AI models for within-government needs, ensuring the privacy of sensitive government data and serving as a hedge against runaway corporate power.

    The only way out is through

    The alternative to a massive public effort like this — attempting to kick the can on the AI problem — won’t cut it.

    The only other serious proposal right now is a “pause” on new AI development, and even many tech skeptics see that as unrealistic. It may even be counterproductive. Our understanding of how powerful AI systems could go rogue is immature at best, but stands to improve greatly through continued testing, especially of larger models. Air-gapped data centers will thus be essential for experimenting with AI failure modes in a secured setting. This includes pushing models to their limits to explore potentially dangerous emergent behaviors, such as deceptiveness or power-seeking.

    The Manhattan Project analogy is not perfect, but it helps to draw a contrast with those who argue that AI safety requires pausing research into more powerful models altogether. The project didn’t seek to decelerate the construction of atomic weaponry, but to master it.

    Even if AGIs end up being farther off than most experts expect, a Manhattan Project for AI safety is unlikely to go to waste. Indeed, many less-than-existential AI risks are already upon us, crying out for aggressive research into mitigation and adaptation strategies. So what are we waiting for?



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    ( With inputs from : www.politico.com )

  • Cong may emerge as single largest party in Karnataka, but not get majority: Opinion poll

    Cong may emerge as single largest party in Karnataka, but not get majority: Opinion poll

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    New Delhi: With just few days left for the crucial Assembly polls in Karnataka, a new opinion poll predicted that the Congress may emerge as the single largest party in the southern state but may fall eight seats short of a clear majority.

    According to the India TV-CNX opinion poll, telecast on the news channel on Sunday, the Congress may win 105 seats in the 224-seat Assembly, while the ruling BJP may win 85 seats, followed by Janata Dal-Secular which may win 32 seats.

    The opinion poll predicted that ‘others’ may win two seats.

    MS Education Academy

    In the 2018 elections, the BJP had won 104, the Congress 80, the JD-S 37, and ‘Others’ had won three seats.

    As per the vote share projections, Congress may get 40.32 per cent, the BJP may get 35.5 per cent, the JD-S 17.81 per cent, and ‘others’ may get 6.37 per cent.

    In the 2018 elections, the Congress had got 38.04 per cent, the BJP had got 36.22 per cent, the JD-S 18.36 per cent and ‘Others’ had got 7.38 per cent votes.

    The opinion poll also predicted that caste and community wise projections show, the Congress may get 75.3 per cent of Kuruba votes, 15.11 per cent Lingayat votes, 17.57 per cent Vokkaliga votes, 40.56 per cent of SC votes, 34.58 per cent of OBC votes, 42.35 per cent of ST votes, and a whopping 78 per cent of Muslim votes.

    On the other hand, the BJP may get 15.14 per cent Kuruba votes, a whopping 75.8 per cent Lingayat votes, 17.39 per cent Vokkaliga votes, 39.6 per cent SC votes, 51.7 per cent OBC votes, 32.18 per cent ST votes and only 2.07 per cent Muslim votes.

    The projection show the JD-S may get 56 per cent Vokkaliga votes.

    The India TV-CNX poll projections region-wise show also predicted that the BJP and the Congress may share 15 seats each in Greater Bengaluru area (32 seats total), while the JD-S) may get two.

    In Central Karnataka’s 21 seats, the BJP may win 13 and Congress eight seats.

    The Congress may sweep the Hyderabad-Karnataka region, winning 32 of the 40 seats, while the BJP may win six and the JD-S two.

    In Old Mysore’s 62 seats, the Congress may win 26 seats, the JD-S may win 28, and the BJP only seven seats. ‘Others’ may win the remaining one seat.

    In coastal Karnataka having 19 seats, the BJP may win 15 and the Congress 4.

    In the Bombay Karnataka region having 50 seats, the BJP may win 29, the Congress may win 20 and ‘Others’ may win one seat.A

    The opinion poll survey findings also showed that Congress leader and former Chief Minister Siddaramaiah still remains the first choice for the top post, leading the list with 32.2 per cent votes, while 26.83 per cent favouring incumbent Basavaraj Bommai as Chief Minister.

    Meanwhile, 16.37 per cent opted for JD-S leader and former CM H.D. Kumaraswamy, while 10.97 per cent favoured BJP leader and former CM B.S. Yeddyurappa and only seven per cent preferred Congress leader D.K. Shivakumar for the Chief Ministerial post.

    The opinion poll survey was carried out by CNX among 11,200 respondents (5,620 males and 5,580 females) in 112 out of a total of 224 seats. The respondents were selected randomly keeping in view demographic, professional and migration dimensions.

    Polling for the Karnataka Assembly is scheduled on May 10 and counting of votes will take place on May 13.

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    ( With inputs from www.siasat.com )

  • Opinion poll shows Modi remains charismatic and popular in poll-bound Karnataka

    Opinion poll shows Modi remains charismatic and popular in poll-bound Karnataka

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    New Delhi: The final round of an exclusive opinion poll on the Karnataka Assembly elections conducted across the state conducted by C-Voter for ABP News reveals that Prime Minister Narendra Modi retains his charisma and popularity among the voters of the southern state.

    While the poll still puts the Congress in the pole position, hectic and energetic campaigning by Modi during the last leg of vote seeking has improved the fortunes of the BJP.

    In the opinion polls for the Assembly elections conducted during March and April, the BJP appeared quite far behind the Congress, both in terms of vote share and number of seats. But an intense last leg of campaigning by the Prime Minister has now ensured that the projected vote share of the BJP doesn’t drop below 36 per cent, the same it had garnered in the 2018 Assembly elections.

    MS Education Academy

    Even BJP’s projected seat tally is now better than the numbers thrown up in March and April. In fact, in the Greater Bengaluru region, which elects 32 MLAs, the improvement is dramatic. From trailing behind the Congress earlier, the BJP seems to have turned the tables somewhat and is now projected to inch ahead of its rival in the projected seat tally.

    While this last-minute effort by Modi may not be enough to help the BJP retain the state (Karnataka has a long history of changing governments), it augurs well for the party ahead of next year’s Lok Sabha elections.

    In the 2018 Assembly elections, while the BJP emerged as the single largest party with 104 seats, it was nine short of a simple majority and a post-poll arrangement between the Congress and the JD(S) saw them form the government.

    In the Lok Sabha elections a year after that, the BJP and candidates won 26 of the 28 seats in the state. A similar pattern was seen in Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan about five years ago. The BJP lost the Assembly elections in all the three states in 2018, but swept all three in the 2019 Lok Sabha elections.

    The 224-member Karnataka Assembly will go to the polls on May 10, and the results will be declared on May 13.

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    #Opinion #poll #shows #Modi #remains #charismatic #popular #pollbound #Karnataka

    ( With inputs from www.siasat.com )

  • Opinion | Trump’s Election Denialism Is Already Winning

    Opinion | Trump’s Election Denialism Is Already Winning

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    This creates a terrible dilemma for Trump’s opponents: How do you run against a defeated president without noting the highly relevant fact that he was, ahem, defeated?

    A new CBS Poll underlines the dynamic. The top-line numbers, with Trump ahead of Florida Governor Ron DeSantis by 58 to 22 percent nationally, aren’t all that different from the latest Fox News poll of the Democratic race, with President Joe Biden leading Democratic candidate Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., 62 to 19 percent.

    CBS also asked what attributes Republicans would like to see in a nominee. Sixty-one percent want a candidate who says Trump won in 2020. That desire among Republican voters inherently favors Trump, since no one is going to be as adamant and outlandish in maintaining that Trump won than Trump himself.

    Among voters supporting Trump, three-quarters say a reason that they are backing him is that he actually won in 2020.

    It wasn’t crazy to think that this view would fade over time after the 2020 election, as passions cooled and as Republicans felt less defensive of the former president. Perhaps most Republicans don’t think that there was honest-to-goodness fraud in 2020, and instead merely believe the rules and the press coverage were unfair — in other words, their answers to pollsters should be taken seriously, not literally.

    Even if this is so, it will still require finesse on part of Trump’s opponents when addressing 2020. And it may well be that Republicans are simply being literal.

    Insisting the election was stolen and convincing his party of this claim has worked for Trump on multiple levels — first and foremost, as a salve to his ego; in the immediate aftermath of the 2020 election, as the rationale for trying to overturn the result; and ever since, as the necessary condition for his come-back (if that’s the right word, since he never left).

    Trump has ruled out of bounds one of the most telling critiques of him for Republican primary voters. Throwing at him that he lost a winnable election in 2020 should be the easiest criticism to make. It doesn’t require departing with him on substance or attacking his character. It needn’t involve condemning him for January 6. It should have, in theory, equal appeal to Trump fans and Trump skeptics, all of whom have a shared interest in defeating Biden. The argument can be swaddled in warm sentiments: “You did so much good and were such a brave fighter as president, Donald, so it’s a real shame you lost. But you did. And we can’t afford to lose again. Sorry.”

    Trump’s contention that he actually won, and his intense bond with his supporters, creates the real possibility that making this case against him will boomerang, though.

    On Trump’s terms, which are widely accepted in the party, admitting the legitimacy of the 2020 election marks someone as a sell-out to the establishment, a political moderate and a weakling rather than a fighter. It also constitutes an affront to Trump, and therefore a kind of personal attack.

    The broad feeling among Republicans is that they don’t want to hear anything disparaging about Trump. In the same poll, CBS News asked what voters would want to see in the 2024 GOP nominee if he or she isn’t Trump. Only 7 percent said they want someone who criticizes Trump. Another 56 percent said they want someone who doesn’t talk about Trump, and 37 percent said they want someone who shows loyalty to him. A crushing total of more than 90 percent of Republicans want silence or acquiescence from a GOP nominee when it comes to his or her predecessor.

    This makes trying to get by Trump in the GOP primaries not just a balancing act, but the political equivalent of performing Philippe Pettit’s walk between the Twin Towers while playing Yankee Doodle on a ukulele.

    The presidential candidates opposing Trump have to choose whether to accept Trump’s version of 2020, to avoid talking about the matter, to dodge by saying the election was “rigged” without calling it stolen or to tell the truth. The temptation to pull up somewhere short of the last option will be strong, but it’s hard to see how anyone defeats Trump without going there.

    If it’s accepted that Trump supposedly beat Biden in 2020, well, then, he’s basically owed another shot at it, and, as a two-time winner of presidential elections, there’s not much of a case that he has an electability problem.

    DeSantis has talked lately of the GOP’s “culture of losing,” an oblique, if obvious reference to Trump. If the governor feels he has to pull his punches before he actually gets in the race, that’s understandable. To deal with this issue only indirectly would be a mistake, though. Trump alienated swing voters, lost his last election and has grasped at any conspiracy theory to try to cover his tracks. DeSantis attracted swing voters, won his last election and doesn’t have anything he needs to feel ashamed about. That’s an enormous difference, and it should figure prominently in the governor’s campaign.

    Give Trump this: He doesn’t necessarily accept public opinion as it is but tries to shape it. Although there’d be widespread Republican doubts about the 2020 election no matter what he said, the belief that it was stolen wouldn’t be as deep and pervasive without his persistent (and deceptive) advocacy. He’s changed the landscape in his favor, and his opponents simply accept it at their peril.

    For Trump to lose the nomination, what should be his chief vulnerability needs to be a vulnerability — and his Republican opponents must try to make it one.

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    ( With inputs from : www.politico.com )

  • Opinion | The Crazy Candidate Will Lose in 2024

    Opinion | The Crazy Candidate Will Lose in 2024

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    election 2024 biden four years ago 60387

    The video, in other words, was another shot in an ongoing war over which party will define itself as more normal in 2024. Republicans thrilled to the line in newly elected Arkansas Gov. Sarah Huckabee Sanders’ GOP response to the State of the Union address that “the choice is between normal or crazy.” That’s a great framing — as long as Republicans aren’t the ones that come off as crazy, which is exactly what Joe Biden and the Democrats are counting on.

    The two sides, naturally, portray their respective positions in different places on the normal-crazy spectrum.

    For Democrats, their support for trans rights is the logical next step in the expansion of civil rights and is all about inclusion; for Republicans, it is an irrational fad that is trampling on parents’ rights and threatening women’s sports.

    For Democrats, the increased focus on race in education is simply teaching the country’s history on racism; for Republicans, it represents an ideologically driven agenda that doesn’t belong in the schools.

    For Democrats, efforts in Florida and elsewhere to remove books with offensive content from public schools is book banning; for Republicans, it is ensuring that children aren’t exposed to inappropriate material in schools whose approach should be resolutely down the middle.

    And so on. The parties will continue to war on these issues, but the top of the tickets in 2024 will have an outsized role in establishing which party gets to claim the mantle of normal.

    Biden and his team figure that in a rematch with Trump, it’s not a contest, and for good reason.

    Trump inveighs against the “crazies” on the other side and portrays himself as a defender of common sense. He’s still fundamentally a disrupter, though. He has no interest in politics as usual, when he believes politics as unusual is what’s needed (and is much more compelling and entertaining).

    For MAGA, normal politics is corrupt. Normal is useless. Normal is a sham. Normal is for suckers. Only their man sees through it all, tells the truth, and will bring the hammer against the establishment like the woman in the famous “1984” Apple ad.

    In 2016, Trump broke all the rules to shake up politics and brought to the fore new positions on immigration, trade and China; now, he wants to break all the rules to wreak vengeance on all the people who supposedly stole the election victory that was rightfully his.

    This all suits Biden just fine. In fact, he couldn’t script a better opponent with a better message and better affect for his purposes.

    Now, with inflation having eroded real wages in recent years and perhaps a recession looming, Biden can’t be complacent. He could lose to anyone.

    Still, Trump’s attempt to get his vice president to subvert the counting of the electoral votes in 2020, his defense of the Jan. 6 rioters, his call for the Constitution to be suspended, his bodyguard of strange loyalists led by Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene, his erratic statements and positions (attacking the state of Florida and threatening not to participate in the Republican debates in just the last couple of days), all make Biden normal by default.

    If Biden’s theory of the case against Trump is correct (circumstances and execution will, of course, matter), it falls apart if someone else is the Republican nominee.

    First of all, a matchup against Trump effectively takes age off the table. Some other Republican makes it front and center.

    Trying to march an 80-year-old man through a national election and another term in office is not normal. Indeed, it’s unprecedented and deeply discomfiting, which is why so many voters think that Biden shouldn’t run again. By contrast, running a 44-year-old (Ron DeSantis) or 57-year-old (Tim Scott) is what you expect.

    The Biden team believes if DeSantis is the GOP nominee, he, too, like Trump, can be branded as a MAGA extremist. In that scenario, though, DeSantis will have taken down Trump in an insanely brutal primary campaign. Trump will presumably be denouncing him as a liar and a cheat for the offense of winning against him. It’s going to be hard to portray DeSantis as a tool of the man who tried to destroy him, and failed, and is likely still trying.

    Then, there’s the substance. With some exceptions (perhaps the fight with Disney most prominently), the DeSantis record is firmly within the range of normal Republican politics. Sure, there will be targets for Democrats to shoot at, but they’re also defenses that DeSantis is well-prepared to make.

    People describe DeSantis as representing Trumpism without Trump, but the last part of that formulation is very important. DeSantis is more combative with the media and has leaned into the culture war more than he might have pre-Trump, but, at the end of the day, he’s nothing like the former president.

    He gives conventional political speeches, not rollicking, digressive off-the-cuff rants to adoring fans. He lives, as far as anyone knows, the life of a good family man, with no affairs with porn stars or Playboy Playmates that need covering up. He’s not getting indicted for anything. He hasn’t given a vitriolic speech to a crowd that’s gone on to bust into the U.S. Capitol or any other government building while he watches from the sidelines doing nothing to stop it.

    The main personal charge against DeSantis is that he’s standoffish, made few friends in Congress and may have once eaten pudding with his fingers, an allegation he denies.

    This is not much material to work with. Even if DeSantis isn’t a backslapper and strikes people as overly earnest, as a general election candidate he’d be a recognizable type — a young, ambitious governor looking to make the step up to the White House like George W. Bush, Bill Clinton and Jimmy Carter before him. These are all different men, with different politics and strengths and weakness, but there’s nothing unprecedented about going from the state house to the White House.

    DeSantis or another Republican who isn’t Trump would be well-positioned to make the race about the incumbent rather than themselves. For all that Biden promised to bring normality back to the White House, his Afghan withdrawal and neglect at the border have shattered whatever reputation he had for competence; the levels of spending have been off the charts; he’s accommodated his party’s left flank, striking out positions that would have been considered wildly radical several years ago; and he’s increasingly governed through legally dubious executive fiat.

    In short, Biden can make the case that Trump isn’t normal, whereas another Republican can see and raise him, and hold out the prospect of moving on from the drama and weirdness of the Trump-Biden years.

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    ( With inputs from : www.politico.com )

  • Opinion | How Biden Could Take Advantage of Trump’s Indictment — The Korean Way

    Opinion | How Biden Could Take Advantage of Trump’s Indictment — The Korean Way

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    Unlike the U.S., which is queasy about prosecuting any former president no matter how awful they are, South Korea is a global leader among wealthy democracies in putting its former presidents in jail. Excluding Yoon, South Korea has had eight presidents since 1980; four of them were imprisoned. Yoon, a former prosecutor, was personally involved in the cases against two of them from his own party.

    In 2016, Yoon was the head of investigation under special prosecutor Park Young-soo — the South Korean equivalent to Special Counsel Jack Smith — and their work ultimately led to the impeachment and removal of then-president Park Geun-hye. The politics of Yoon, who is now the country’s top conservative, were not clear at the time, nor did it matter. He captivated the nation with his take-no-prisoners approach to the investigation. The criminal prosecution of Park, based largely on the facts that Yoon investigated, led to a 20-year sentence. The succeeding president Moon Jae-in and his liberal administration rewarded Yoon by appointing him as the powerful Seoul Central District Prosecutor. Then in 2018, Yoon’s office indicted another former president, Lee Myung-bak, who served before Park from 2008 to 2013, for bribery and embezzlement. Lee was convicted and sentenced to a 17-year prison term.

    Yoon’s central role in these (ex-)presidential prosecutions turned him into a political star despite his total lack of charisma. A career prosecutor with no prior electoral experience, Yoon may be the worst public speaker that South Korean politics has ever seen. During his presidential campaign, Yoon’s tendency to speak in run-on sentences that swerved wildly into eyebrow-raising statements — such as praising South Korea’s former dictators as “good at growing the economy” or advocating for a 120-hour work week and relaxing food safety laws so that “poor people can choose to eat substandard food” — earned him the nickname “a Gaffe a Day.” (Yet another parallel with Biden, one might add.)

    Nevertheless, his public image as a principled prosecutor standing against the highest power was enough to carry him through a razor-thin presidential election victory in March 2022. Biden may not be a prosecutor himself, but Yoon’s tactics could provide Biden the same kind of political power if applied subtly by his allies. Perhaps during the state dinner at the White House, Biden might lean into Yoon’s ear to whisper: How do I capture some of that magic and take advantage of these investigations?

    First, Yoon might answer, leverage the allure of the rule of law. South Koreans are deeply cynical people with low trust in government — much like the politically polarized voters of the U.S. But that cynicism, in fact, is a by-product of a strong desire to see a fair application of law that punishes even the most powerful. One of Yoon’s shining moments was early in the Park Geun-hye administration in 2013, when he led the team that investigated the Lee administration’s use of its spy agency to help elect Park in the presidential election. When conservative legislators criticized him, Yoon declared: “My loyalty is not to a person.” Even to a cynical audience, such high-minded appeals to the rule of law can resonate.

    Second, make sure to get the media on your side. In a high-profile political trial, a classic prosecutor’s tactic is to make well-timed leaks to journalists, making the defendant face a parallel trial before the public in addition to the one in the courtroom. Despite being a poor public speaker, Yoon could exert significant public influence because of his mastery of this tactic.

    So far, Biden remains tight-lipped on the indictment of Trump, a wise move that allows the president to seem above the fray. All fine and good, but Biden and his staff could also privately communicate with journalists to create a media circus, as Yoon did. Technically under South Korean law, it is a criminal offense for a prosecutor to disclose information gained from an investigation prior to an indictment. As a prosecutor, Yoon flagrantly disregarded this prohibition. Yoon was well known for constantly working the phone with journalists and had been spotted meeting with owners of major newspapers. News reports speculated he gave the media access to inside information in exchange for his favored narrative and self-promotion.

    Third, and most important: Always look out for number one, and never forget the fact that you are doing this for your own advancement. Yoon would not have become the president if he simply rested on his laurels after prosecuting the two ex-presidents. Following Lee’s imprisonment, Moon sought to dramatically curtail the investigative power of prosecutors, in a move his opponents criticized as an attempt to cover his own behind. If Yoon had acquiesced, he would simply be remembered as a famed former prosecutor who ended his career as one of Seoul’s many law firm partners.

    Instead, Yoon staged a full-scale revolt. In order to protect the power of his office, he turned against his boss, Justice Minister Cho Kuk, a star liberal politician who was tasked with the prosecution reform that could threaten Yoon’s power as prosecutor. Claiming corruption, Yoon targeted Cho with attacks even more wide-ranging and vicious than any of his previous investigations. It was a stunning about-face, as if Attorney General Merrick Garland suddenly went all-in on investigating Hunter Biden in an overt pursuit of power and popularity. Yoon’s investigation team carried out more than a hundred raids that included Cho’s house, workplace, his mother’s home, his brother’s home, his wife’s workplace and his children’s schools.

    Tipped off in advance, a throng of journalists swarmed each raid location, shoving a camera and microphone at anyone who would come out. In an infamous episode, no less than a dozen journalists blocked the motor scooter of a delivery worker coming out of Cho’s residence, desperately asking what the Justice Minister’s family had ordered. Thousands of news reports raised allegations that Cho was forming a secret political slush fund based on his investment in a private equity fund, even though all these raids failed to uncover any evidence of corruption. Yoon then pivoted to alleging that Cho’s wife forged documents for their daughter’s college admission, and won a four-year sentence against the Justice Minister’s wife. In the end, the prosecutors could not indict Cho or his family on corruption charges, but no matter — unable to withstand the onslaught, Cho resigned from his post, with his political life all but finished.

    Yoon’s attack on Cho made him an unlikely hero for South Korea’s conservatives, which suited Yoon just fine. For a career prosecutor with little political conviction other than Nietzschean will to power, the conservative People Power Party, weakened by the imprisonment of two of its former presidents, became an ideal target for his hostile takeover. With their party in shambles, most South Korean conservatives were ready to welcome any credible champion. The PPP’s old guard, the fans of Park who considered Yoon their archenemy, could offer little resistance. His rise to the top made one lesson clear: Mastering the art of prosecuting political rivals is the most powerful tool an ambitious politician can yield.

    In the end, just five years after South Korean conservatives suffered the embarrassing meltdown that was Park’s impeachment, they recaptured the presidency with Yoon. Imagine, Yoon might tell Biden, what you could do for Democrats in the wake of a Trump prosecution.

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    ( With inputs from : www.politico.com )

  • Opinion | The Supreme Court Stopped Short of a Radical Act

    Opinion | The Supreme Court Stopped Short of a Radical Act

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    But what if the politics of judicial reform are already shifting under the justices’ feet?

    The high-profile state Supreme Court race in Wisconsin — and the potential fallout — suggests that may be the case. During the midterms, that quintessential purple state delivered slim victories to a Democratic governor and a Republican senator. Less than five months later, though, a left-leaning candidate, Judge Janet Protasiewicz, ran up a double-digit advantage over her right-of-center opponent.

    The Protasiewicz win fits awkwardly with a well-hallowed chestnut of political wisdom — that the politics of judicial power aren’t symmetrical across the party line. Simply put, Republican voters tend to have stronger feelings than Democrats about judicial appointments, and cast their votes in primaries to punish or reward candidates on that basis. In contrast, there’s some evidence that Democratic voters punish candidates who center campaigns on the courts. Republicans, indeed, have kept their eyes on the prize by prioritizing ideological consistency. Democrats such as President Joe Biden have instead aimed for representativeness across gender, ethnicity and professional grounds. The result is a less ideologically consistent and less coherent bench of Biden and Obama appointees.

    In addition to his own centrist, institutionally minded temperament, it is likely this uneven pattern of voter attention to the courts that shaped the way in which the Biden White House has so far approached the politics of court reform. Rather than embracing calls on the left to expand the Supreme Court, the newly inaugurated president created a sprawling, bipartisan commission to study the question of reform. The body was largely staffed with legal academics of diverse views and partisan orientations. It was entirely predictable that such a group would not reach a consensus on reform. The commission was plainly designed to delay, and hence deflate, the push for structural change to the federal courts. And so it did — producing an extensive and academic report that elicited precisely nothing of political or practical significance.

    But Wisconsin’s judicial election earlier this month suggests that the White House’s assessment of how judicial politics plays among Democratic voters no longer holds water. That election may signal a broader shift in the tectonics of voter mobilization in respect to courts and judges more generally.

    The most obvious reason for thinking something has changed is that it was Democrats, and not Republicans, who were galvanized by the judicial election. These voters, moreover, were moved by the issue of judicial power but were not motivated as much by the goal of electing Democrats. In a state Senate race held that same day, the Republican candidate eked out a win. That too was a highly consequential election, giving Republicans a Senate supermajority and the votes to oust officials through impeachment.

    Nor can it be said that the issue of abortion made all the difference: The question of reproductive choice plainly loomed large in November 2022. And yet GOP Sen. Ron Johnson, always a reliable voice for the anti-abortion position, retained his seat. Plainly, abortion politics explains in part why Protasiewicz won — but it can’t be the whole story.

    In the wake of her election, we may also see more realignment in the politics of court reform. Until now, it has been Democrats on the left of their party who had pressed hardest for changing the courts through structural reform or other measures.

    But in Wisconsin, Republicans were talking of impeaching Protasiewicz… before she had even won the election, let alone taken office. This is all the more remarkable because — unless she’s committed a crime — Protasiewicz can be impeached only for “conduct in office,” according to the state constitution, i.e. for things she presumably may do in the future.

    Some state GOP lawmakers have since backed away from such talk, and in any event, the Democratic governor would be empowered to appoint a replacement. But the legislature could respond to rulings they dislike with the kinds of other tools that progressives have been advocating at the national level: measures such as jurisdiction-stripping and changes to the size of the court.

    If the political script on judicial power gets flipped in Wisconsin — if GOP legislators act to rein in a liberal-leaning court — what could this bode for a broader change nationally? Or what happens if conservative federal judges or Supreme Court justices advance a far-right agenda reviled by progressives and even many centrists?

    Surely, the next time Democrats have full control of Washington, the push to overhaul the judiciary will be a top priority, if they have the votes.

    Even apart from its precedent-shattering opinions, some justices are doing little to build trust in the court. ProPublica’s revelations that Justice Clarence Thomas both received expensive gifts and engaged in six-figure real-estate transactions with a conservative billionaire will add fuel to the fire of public suspicion. Democratic calls for Thomas’ impeachment are, of course, unlikely to lead to any legislative action. But in striking contrast to the impeachment calls targeting Protasiewicz, they draw public attention to judicial behavior that plainly raises serious ethical questions, even if it doesn’t in the end cross a line into rank illegality.

    All this means that the political dynamics of court reform are on the verge of a momentous shift: Democratic voters are likely to be more energized, and more likely to stomach what might have once seemed explosive measures. And for once, they may even be willing to reward candidates for public office who promise to follow through.

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    ( With inputs from : www.politico.com )

  • Opinion | The GOP’s Moderate Frontrunner

    Opinion | The GOP’s Moderate Frontrunner

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    Back in 2016, the most moderate Republican candidate in the race was Ohio Gov. John Kasich, who lost everywhere except his home state.

    Perhaps the most moderate candidate in the GOP field as of this moment is former President Donald Trump.

    He established himself as a different sort of Republican beginning in 2015. If you want a Republican who won’t cut spending or start foreign wars, he is still your man.

    Added to this now is clearly a discomfort with the fight over abortion in the post-Roe environment.

    Trump’s main line of attack against Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis is from the left. He’s hitting the Florida governor hard for his past support for reining in Social Security and Medicare. His super PAC’s ad on this theme is functionally indistinguishable from the countless spots Democrats have run over the years attacking Republicans for even looking at entitlements crosswise.

    All that’s missing is an image of DeSantis pushing an elderly person in a wheelchair over a cliff, although Trump made a favorable reference to that infamous anti-Paul Ryan ad in a Truth Social post.

    He’s also called the governor’s culture-war clash with Disney “so unnecessary” and “a political stunt,” while not entering the fray in the conservative war with Bud Light.

    Of course, Trump’s personal power is such that he’s made loyalty to himself and to his claims that the 2020 election was stolen the standard for being considered right-wing — orthodox conservatives who reject Trump are more apt to be labeled moderates than Trump himself.

    The substantive definition of the right is also up for grabs. What is the more right-wing position? Trump saying that he’ll end the Ukraine war in a day through his personal diplomacy — the kind of naive position once associated with soft-headed Democrats — or a hawk saying that he’ll continue to arm Ukraine to the hilt? It depends who you ask.

    All of this is an indication of how Trump can be ideologically difficult to pin down, which benefited him in 2016 — both in the primaries and in the general — and could work for him again.

    The alleged radicalism of Donald Trump has mostly to do with his personal conduct, his outrageous statements, his conspiracy theories and his contempt for norms and rules. None of these are to be dismissed lightly — indeed, they made for a toxic brew after his loss in the 2020 election — but none of them is ideological, either.

    In theory, it’d be possible to be perfectly polite and support a border wall (in fact, this describes most Republicans), or be in favor of open borders and be just as fond as Trump is of coming up with insulting nicknames for rivals.

    If Trump were given a magic wand to move America in his direction policy-wise on his core commitments, and we had a secure border, more tariffs, fewer foreign entanglements, greater domestic energy production, the status-quo on entitlements, and a step toward the center-right and away from what Trump calls the “radical-left lunatics” on most cultural issues, no one would think he or she were living in a right-wing dystopia — at least not if they didn’t know who was wielding the wand.

    It’s Trump’s unique contribution to take an issue mix that could have broad appeal and make it toxic by association with himself.

    In the 2016 nomination fight, Trump’s approach — getting to the rest of the field’s right on some issues (immigration, China) and to its left on others (especially entitlements) — paved his path to the nomination. That road didn’t run through self-described “very conservative” voters, but “somewhat” conservatives.

    Ted Cruz put up the stiffest resistance, but winning the very conservatives, or winning them overall by a relatively small margin (42-36 percent according to an ABC News analysis), wasn’t enough for him to overcome Trump’s standing with the somewhat conservatives and moderates.

    The crucial South Carolina primary illustrated the dynamic perfectly. According to the exit polling, Cruz won very conservative voters, with 35 percent to Trump’s 29 and Rubio’s 19.

    Trump won somewhat conservatives, with 35 percent to Rubio’s 25 and Cruz’s 17. And Trump won moderates, with 34 percent to Rubio’s 23 and Kasich’s 21.

    In other words, Trump was competitive with the very conservatives while besting the other candidates with the other two factions.

    Now, Trump has reversed the poles of his support. He’s most formidable with very conservatives and DeSantis is strongest with somewhat conservatives. The governor’s strategy of trying to peel off Trump supporters among the very conservative voters by getting to his right on substance, while appealing to the center-right with an electability argument, makes sense in theory.

    On the one hand, it’s possible that Trump, by softening on abortion and other culture-war issues, is doing DeSantis’ work for him, especially in the crucial early state of Iowa. On the other hand, the governor could lose voters who care about electability if a sense takes hold that his six-week abortion ban, anti-woke educational initiatives and war on Disney go too far for voters in a general election; there are mutterings about this among donors and politicos. Trump’s distinctive moderation plays into his counter-electability case — according to the latest Yahoo poll, a majority of Republicans think Trump is a better bet to win a general than DeSantis.

    Moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue, Barry Goldwater famously said in his signature riff in his 1964 acceptance speech. That may be true enough, but Donald Trump, of all people, is out to demonstrate that it could be a virtue in pursuit of the Republican presidential nomination.

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    ( With inputs from : www.politico.com )