New Delhi: National Council of Educational Research and Training (NCERT) has removed paragraphs from Class 12 Political Science textbooks that contained information about the ban briefly imposed on Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) by the then government after the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi.
Along with this, paragraphs which stated that Gandhi’s quest for Hindu-Muslim unity provoked Hindu extremists have also been removed from the curriculum.
Significantly, NCERT had made several changes in the textbooks of Class 6 to Class 12 last year. Among these, chapters titled ‘Rise of Popular Movements’ and ‘Era of One Party Dominance’ were removed from Class 12 textbook, ‘Politics in India since Independence’.
Similarly, chapters on ‘Democracy and Diversity’, ‘Popular Struggles and Movements’, and ‘Challenges to Democracy’ were removed from Class 10 textbook ‘Democratic Politics-II’.
Significantly, in the last 15 years, Nathuram Godse was referred to in the History book of Class 12 as a ‘Brahmin from Pune’ who assassinated Gandhi, which has been removed now.
As per NCERT, they had been receiving complaints of Godse’s caste mentioned in the books from CBSE and several state education boards since long, stating that one’s caste should not be unnecessarily mentioned in school textbooks.
Speaking on the matter in Parliament, Minister of State for Education Annapurna Devi stated that the syllabus of books was rationalised in view of the loss of education in the pandemic and it was done to reduce the stress faced by students.
NCERT Director Dinesh Prasad Saklani said that the load of textbooks was reduced as the students had suffered a lot in the pandemic and it was an attempt to help the stressed students and as a responsibility towards society and the nation.
Along with this, the NCERT has categorically rejected allegations that the changes have been made to suit a particular ideology.
New NCERT books have arrived for the new session this year. Last year, many chapters and facts were removed from the books of various subjects in NCERT. With these changes made by NCERT, now these new books are being made available for the students.
New Delhi: National Council of Educational Research and Training (NCERT) has revised its books, including the 12th class History book by removing the chapters on the Mughal empire. The change will be applicable to all the schools that follow NCERT across the country.
From Class 12, chapters related to ‘Kings and Chronicles; the Mughal Courts (C. 16th and 17th centuries)’ have been removed from the History book ‘Themes of Indian History-Part 2’.
Similarly, NCERT will remove some poems and paragraphs from the Hindi textbooks too.
As per NCERT, all the changes made will be implemented from the current academic session, i.e. 2023-2024.
Along with History and Hindi textbooks, the 12th-class Civics book has also been revised. Two chapters titled, ‘American Hegemony in World Politics’ and ‘The Cold War Era’ has been removed from the book.
Continuing with the changes, two chapters namely, ‘Rise of Popular Movements’ and ‘Era of One Party Dominance’ from the Class 12th textbook ‘Indian Politics after Independence’ have also been removed.
Changes have been made in Class 10th and 11th textbooks as well, such as chapters on ‘Democracy and Diversity’, ‘Popular Struggles and Movements’, and ‘Challenges of Democracy’ have been removed from Class 10th book ‘Democratic Politics-2’.
Chapters such as ‘Central Islamic Lands’, ‘Clash of Cultures’, and ‘Industrial Revolution’ have been dropped from the Class 11th textbook ‘Themes in World History’.
Confirming these changes, senior officials said that the new syllabus and textbooks have been updated from this year and are being implemented in various schools.
Architect Dr Sameer Hamdani’s book on sectarian reconciliation in Kashmir is a Himalayan contribution in offering a narrative purged from bias and slants, writes Raashid Maqbool
Hakim Sameer Hamdani’s book on Kashmir’s sectarian reconcilation being launched in Srinagar in March 2023. KL Image Fayaz Ahmad Najar
Generations in Kashmir have grown up on folklore grapevine apparently aimed at retaining the rightful ground of truth and righteousness. These are basically divisive tools for othering people. These are as common among Sunnis as they are within Shia Muslim sect in Kashmir.
These ‘anecdotes’ have been fed to generations by the family and the community as a result of which they grow up trying to make sense of things around them. Generated by the myriad auto-piloted machinations of, what Sameer Hamdani, describes as the dapan tradition, within and outside Kashmir, these tales have shaped up initial perceptions of generations about each other as two communities.
I think these stories have very strong localized contexts rooted in the socio-political history of the respective places.
A Medieval Mess+-shia
In the Kashmir case, most of these twisted and fabricated stories can be traced to the happenings in the medieval period in which the foundation of our Muslim identity was laid.
Many deep grudges between the two communities discussed in Hamdani’s book, Shi’ism in Kashmir: A History of Sunni-Shia Rivalry and Reconciliation, emanate from what happened or didn’t happen and should have otherwise happened during that period. Our classical works of history, even some “iconic” and widely referred ones, are replete with examples of selective exposure of “facts” and even of deliberate de-contextualisation. Therefore, much of our scholarship and understanding of the past that shapes our sense of identity and belonging even today is marred by bitter dissension. The fractured narrations of past events supplied and reinforced by such loaded sources often throw up scenarios in which our community-specific and collective vulnerabilities are exposed and exploited.
I don’t intend to debate the quotient of impartiality that an account of history should carry. Instead, I want to make a point that in order to have a comprehensive view of past events we need to have different points of view in front of us. Unfortunately, many works of history that followed the widely accepted “seminal” books and borrowed heavily from them, failed to critically engage with these texts and peddled the twisted narratives as truth. The sectarian question particularly was bundled under distorted details, skewed narratives, and pejorative remarks. This question would either be ignored or would be mishandled. A bold and scholarly approach to this part of Kashmir’s history was overdue.
This is where Sameer’s book becomes crucial.
Earlier Attempts
There have been some attempts earlier towards presenting an alternative view to some of the “established” facts of our history and also to provide supplementary information missing in our so-called “iconic” works about this sensitive topic.
The first step was taken by Sameer’s grandfather Hakeem Safdar Hamdani in the 1970s by publishing a concise history of Shia in Kashmir. It had certain flaws which were removed when a comprehensive edition of the book, with references and annotations, was published by Sameer Hamdani and Maqbool Sajid in 2013.
Subsequently, Munshi Ishaq’s diary was published by his son (late) Munshi Ghulam Hassan and another book highlighted some glimpses of Shia history by Moulvi Ghulam Ali Gulzar. Recent in the series is Justice Hakeem Imtiyaz Hussain’s book on the history of Shias in Kashmir. He first published a concise two-volume book in English and in 2022 released the first volumes of its Urdu version, and four more are expected to come. In almost all of these works the focus has been to correct the historical narrative and balance the story, though with an obvious Shia slant.
What makes Sameer’s book unique and significant is his scholarly approach to the problem.
Sameer does not merely dish out facts to his readers, he instead weaves them into a thread that flows throughout his work highlighting the occasions of rivalries and reconciliation between the two sects. The author elucidates the complexities of historical events through proper contextualisation. While dislodging the dominant narratives about sectarian conflagration through his meticulous contestations he doesn’t seem to impose the alternative view, rather he helps it evolve through critical engagement.
Sameer starts to deconstruct the story right from the beginning. His critical analysis of the contested historiographic or hagiographic works of the early Muslim period reveals the attempt of an otherwise celebrated man, Azam Dedhmari to give a sectarian spin to the beginning of Muslim rule in Kashmir. “By doing away with any hint of Shi’i-ness in visiting the beginning of Muslim rule in Kashmir, Dedhmari systematically frames the foundation of Muslim rule in Kashmir as a Sunni enterprise,” Sameer wrote. “Later in the text when he does visit the origin of Shi’ism in Kashmir he links it to intrigue and deceit.”
While the author exposes the distortions by Khuihami and the polemical approach of Dedhmari, the author does not miss mentioning the nuanced approach adopted by Dedhmari’s contemporary Abul Qasim Mohammad Aslam towards the Shia sect.
Removing the thick layers from the Shia-Sunni rivalry in Kashmir, Sameer situates it less in the religious realm and more in the power politics of different Sufi orders who were competing over the supremacy of their respective factions.
He draws attention to the rivalries between different Sufi orders and shows how the tussle between the elites wielding power or aspiring power is wrapped in sectarian clashes.
While debunking the imaginary rivalry between Sheikh Hamza Makhdoom and Mir Shamsuddin Araqi, for example, Sameer reveals many discrepancies and paradoxes in the hagiographic accounts of two ardent disciples of Sheikh: Baba Davood Khaki and Haider Tulmuli. Despite the marked difference between their time periods the two revered figures have been shown as contemporaries and stories are weaved around them and even about their showdown that has travelled through generations. While signalling a possible reworking of a historical figure like Sheikh Makhdoom by his disciples who were involved in negotiations with Emperor Akbar regarding the removal of Check sultans, Sameer finds it intriguing. Again it indicates that the objective behind stoking the sectarian fire during those tumultuous times was more political than religious.
Hakim Sameer Hamdani (author)
Citing examples from political classes like Checks and other nobles Sameer reveals how in the pursuit of power blood relations and sectarian denominations became meaningless. The religious and political elite and also the business class from both communities defined the moments of schism and harmony depending on the chances of disparity or compatibility in their interest. Common people were either largely missing from the scene or they are seen only as pawns or victims of the game.
Sameer has displayed his integrity to facts, rather than giving in to any possible bias, when he looks at the personality of Mir Araki from both Shia and Sunni sources. While mentioning Araki’s “charisma” he does not omit the mention of his “idiosyncracies”. He talks about the incident of the burning of Sililat-al-Zahab and Araqi’s “harshness of conduct in dealing with the rival Sufi orders.”
I see it also as an exercise of proper conflict mapping. It enhances our understanding of the rift by situating it in the larger context of regional power play and class dynamics. Better mapping of a conflict leads to a clearer understanding of the mess and paves way for resolution or conflict transformation. Sameer rues the fact that in medieval histories, “Shi’i and Sunni identity is articulated in opposition to one another, rather than on the basis of similarities within each group.”
Rare Insights
Besides, the industrious work gives deep insights into Shia society. The author discusses the discord within the Shia community in detail and also highlights its repercussions on the community’s life. This part explains the disenfranchisements and deprivations of the community because of the reasons within. It also creates scope for introspection and course correction.
Sameer has documented many perennial aspects of Shia life in Kashmir that are central to its existence. The phyeri circuit, peers, crafts persons and marsiya khwani are some examples. These might appear to some as peripheral to the theme of the book but Sameer has linked them to the narrative thread like a master storyteller. His architectural skills have been put to the best of their use here.
Kashmiri Marsiya no doubt is part of the literature of mourning produced globally by Muslims, however, it has a definite indigenous character that makes it unique. By exploring its evolution during different regimes Sameer highlights its importance not only as a ritual but more significantly as an act of preserving the identity and articulating grief caused by tyrannical power structures. This aspect surely warrants more inquiry.
The Muslim Unity
Sameer Hamdani book on Kashmir Shia Sunni relations (2023)
On the Muslim unity issue, for example, there is no denial, as the author notes, post-revolution Iran propelled it but at the same time, there were local initiatives like Majlis-e-Tahafuz etc., even before the revolution that played a significant role in propagating and safeguarding values of unity and sectarian harmony among masses. The Iranian regime post revolution, gave such initiatives and sensibilities a currency and even jurisprudential backup.
Again the role and contribution of reformist and socio-educational movements like Tanzeem-ul-Makatib also need to be analysed while assessing the changing social dynamics of the community. And similarly, the Najaf-Qom binary needs to be seen in the light of the historical process that brought Qom to the centre stage of the Shia world and consequently increased its influence in Shia communities. The author referred to this influence and its impact in Kashmir in the last chapter of the book.
(This is a hugely edited version of the review speech that scholar journalist Raashid Maqbool made at the book launch in Srinagar.)
Lt Gen Brij Mohan Kaul, the Lahore-born Kashmiri Pandit soldier, was a young colonel when he was posted in Kashmir in 1948 spring to manage the JK Militia. Though having a direct line to the Prime Minister, Jawahar Lal Nehru, Kaul was shifted out in October. In his memoir, Kaul details the war and his brush-up with Sheikh Mohamad Abdullah
Zoji La 1947: Kashmiri men taking the ammunition to the Indian army posts for fighting with the Pakistani intruders in 1947-48.
On 25 April (1948), I flew from Delhi to Kashmir to take over my new assignment. Maj Gen KS Thimayya was in the same plane to assume command of our forces in Jammu and Kashmir. Two days later I accompanied Thimayya to Poonch. The flight to this garrison was, as always, a tricky affair because the aircraft had to take a precarious turn over a nullah and come tortuously onto its airstrip, skirting dangerously past enemy positions nearby.
Thimayya heard that a large number of warring Pathans were meeting in a jirgah (tribal council), not far from Poonch. He conveyed this significant information to the Army and Air Headquarters, Delhi and asked for an air strike on this sitting target. Generals Bucher and Gracey, the Indian and the Pakistan Army Chiefs, then got in touch with each other. No one knows what they talked.
At the end of their pow-wow, Bucher warned our government that if an air strike was carried out on these Pathans, Pakistan might take this reprisal seriously enough to declare war on us. (As if we were playing cards with Pakistan, as things stood!) So these Pathans were left untouched only to fight us wherever they chose and we preferred to take advice in this matter from a foreign General rather than one of our own, such as Cariappa or Thimayya.
(During one of my discussions with Nehru about this time, I suggested that we should hit the Pakistan bases. Nehru said he was not in favour of extending our operational activities against that country because he had been assured by his advisers that Pakistan would collapse financially in a matter of months as its creaking economy could not bear the burdens of a war for long. I remember telling him that one of the major Power blocs would ensure that Pakistan does not ‘disappear’ on account of money. No country, however small, was allowed to ‘die’ by interested parties, because of financial difficulties. It was to the advantage of one country or another to come to her aid ‘in her hour of need’. Later events proved that Pakistan grew stronger, and not weaker, with the passage of time.)
In Uri War Theatre
I was driving Thimayya’s jeep on the way to Uri. There was a nip in the air and the fragrance of pines around. As we reached Mahura, we were warned by the local commander that between there and our destination the enemy was sniping the road from the other side of the river. It was customary for a certain senior commander here to travel in such conditions in an armoured car for personal safety. Thimayya, however, thought a commander should move about in battle within view of his men and not sheltered inside an armoured car. We, therefore, resumed our journey in a jeep, driven by me, and as we were turning a corner on this winding uphill road, a South Indian soldier came rushing towards us and blocked our way. He was hatless and dishevelled and belonged to a Madras battalion, located not far from where we were. He said his Commanding Officer, Lt Col Menon, had just been ambushed by the enemy.
Hamla Awar Khabardaar: Womens Defence Corps in Kashmir, a 1947 photograph
Early that morning, a ‘friendly’ Bakarwal, (a nomad) in reality an enemy agent, woke up Lt Col Menon and told him that the Pakistanis had overnight infiltrated up to a point adjacent to his battalion headquarters and that if required he could show him where this was. The Colonel, a gallant and inquisitive man, at once agreed to accompany his informant and to get to grips with the enemy. They had barely gone a few hundred yards, when the Bakarwal himself took cover behind a boulder and signalled Menon to carry on.
Poor Menon unsuspectingly walked straight into an enemy trap and along with some of his men was shot dead. The man who had related this account was the odd survivor.
General Thimayya and I, on hearing this story, jumped out of the jeep and rushed up towards the scene of this action. It was perhaps not prudent to do so as we might have been ambushed also, but then every action is not logical in war. Thimayya was anxious to see where one of his subordinates had lost his life and set a good example to others in the field in doing so.
Grand Welcome
When I first reached Srinagar, Sheikh Abdullah, arranged for me a huge rally of the Militia I was taking over. He was there himself and introduced me to this force, relating how hurriedly it was raised when Pakistan attacked Kashmir and describing brave deeds by many Kashmiris including Zadu who sacrificed his life near Tithwal.
(I found this force needed brushing up in discipline, tactics and shooting. I, accordingly, took adequate steps to raise its military standards. I must admit, however, that to have initially organized this Militia in a crisis from a scratch was an excellent effort on the part of the Kashmir leaders.)
In Handwara
The Army High Command decided to launch a two-pronged attack on the enemy: one near Uri and the other near Handwara so that both the drives should meet near Domel-Muzzaflfarabad. I was asked to commit two Militia infantry battalions to these operations. In view of the urgency of the occasion, I hastened to prepare the requisite units to participate in these two offensives. I found, however, that many of them needed improvement physically, in handling their weapons or in minor tactics. Yet, they had to make a start sometime. So they took up positions with 161-Brigade at Uri and 163-Brigade at Handwara.
One of the historic 1947-48 war photographs taken by legendary photographer Henri Cartier-Bresson.
Thimayya and I went up to the Nagi Picquet in 163 Brigade commanded by Brigadier (now Lt Gen) Harbakhsh Singh. It was situated on the top of a spur, half of which was held by us and the other half by Pakistanis. We struggled up the hill, and passed through some dead ground which the enemy was sniping.
The operation in Handwara began on 16 May. A day before, a man called Nazir, once a forest officer and now at the disposal of the army, voluntarily went out in disguise to penetrate the enemy’s forward-defended localities and bring back whatever operational information he could. After staking his life in a deadly situation, he returned the next day triumphantly, with invaluable ‘intelligence’ about the enemy.
Harbakhsh then launched his attack with 163 Brigade boldly and pushed the enemy back to Tithwal. I remained during this operation with him and the troops on the 16th and 17th as I had one of my Militia battalions here. But for lack of logistical support, he would have exploited this success further.
Uri Battles
I reached Uri on 18 May, the plan was for 161 Brigade to capture the heights of Islamabad feature held by the enemy opposite Uri and resume our advance to Domel.
It was reliably learnt that the enemy used to virtually abandon his position at the top of the Islamabad feature, holding it lightly and spend the nights at lower and warmer altitudes, on the reverse slopes. It was accordingly decided to capture this feature by a surprise night attack and the Second Dogras were entrusted with this job.
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, Rakumari Amrit Kaur and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, Deputy Prime Minister of India during the proceedings of the annual meeting of the National Conference at Srinagar on September 24, 1949.
A day before the attack, – when reached Uri – our men, were caught in the enemy mortar and artillery bombardment and suffered many casualties. The Brigade Commander and I, as also some others, had a taste of some shelling as we lay trying to locate enemy positions in an area called the ‘Fort’. On the D day, the Dogras quietly assembled near the Uri bridge, held their breath and looked at their watches. There was pin-drop silence and an air of excitement. At the tick of H hour, which was ten at night, they slipped across the Forming-up place on their tip-toes and started going up the massive Islamabad feature. The plan was to storm its heights before first light and catch the enemy unawares. But, somehow, our men look longer to crawl up this position and, in the meantime, the enemy, getting scent of their advent, stole a march and were ready to give us a hot reception from the top.
When the Dogras, instead of capturing their objective, got involved in a battle, the Brigade Commander had to send 66 Rajputana Rifles to retrieve this situation later.
If the delay in the capture of the Islamabad feature had not taken place and the operation had come off as originally planned, we would have had the enemy on the run and might well have captured Domel. Now he got time to consolidate his positions all along the route, anticipated our moves and frustrated our plans.
During the previous night, before the Rajputana Rifles saved the situation, the Brigade Commander and I sat all night in a forward position, frozen in the cold and wondering how the attack of 2 Dogra was progressing. As the Commanding Officer was hugging the roadside and was miles away from the men he commanded, he was out of the picture. He was, therefore, in no position to send back any news of how the attack was going, whilst we waited to hear from him. During the same night, we saw a multitude of lights going up the Haji Pir Pass which confused us completely. Was the enemy coming upon us from our rear or the flank, or was he withdrawing to some other point? Later, we discovered that it was only a diversionary move and a ruse on his part.
During the next three days or so, I found myself amidst a ding-dong battle which followed. The enemy had set up a strong position astride the main road. Lt Col (now Maj Gen) ‘Sparrow’ Rajinder Singh and I were standing near a point swept by enemy fire when Lt Col Oberoi of the Gorkhas came up from Thimayya’s headquarters and asked us where the Brigade Commander was, as he had an important message for him. We told him Brigadier Sen was near a hut just beyond, but as the enemy machine-gun fire prevented anyone moving further, we suggested he should wait and we would all go together. Oberoi ridiculed our caution and proceeded forward. In a fit of bravado, Rajinder
Singh and I also staggered ahead. We had hardly covered a few yards along the road when a burst of machine-gun fire whizzed past us, over our heads, missing us narrowly. We fell on the ground in double-quick time to get below the level of this hail of bullets. Oberoi, a brave officer, now saw, good-humouredly, that our earlier warning to him had some meaning.
7 Sikh were given orders to advance on the left of the road by eight on the night of 21 May and capture a certain height. They came under heavy fire and could not make much headway. Our main effort, on the road, also encountered stiff opposition. Our right hook by the Kumaonis, led gallantly by Lt Col (now Lt Gen) MM Khanna, however, went well but had to be halted lest it out-stretched itself logistically. The Brigade, as a whole, came to a standstill after a little more fruitless fighting and our advance petered out not far from the 58th mile-stone on the Uri-Domel Road.
Thimayya had made a bold bid for Domel. He was a good leader himself, and though some of his subordinate commanders fought well, he failed to capture his prize.
A Crisis In Ladakh
In August, a frantic signal was received from the Leh garrison commander, Lt Col Prithi Chand, to say that as he had been told by the authorities to fight to the last round and the last man, he must comment that though he had the will, he did not have the means to do so. He added that unless his shortages in men, ammunition, rations and clothing were made up, he must inform all concerned clearly that he would not be able to hold on to Leh for long, in view of overwhelming enemy pressure.
Tribal fighters who were captured in Kashmir in 1947
Thimayya sympathized with all concerned when they were in such a predicament. I had come to see him in some other connection, soon after he had received this signal. When he read it out to me, I volunteered to go to Leh so that I could report to him objectively what the situation was like. He agreed to my request and the next morning I flew to Leh.
The air route to Ladakh ran via Zoji which was still in enemy hands. When our Dakota was flying above the pass, the enemy opened machine-gun fire, hit one of its wings but the plucky pilot landed us at Leh safely a few minutes later.
Leh was 11500 feet high and was surrounded by picquets up to altitudes of 16,000 feet. In those days during their halts at Leh, our aircraft never switched off their engines, lest they froze and flew back to Srinagar within fifteen minutes.
On arrival at Ladakh’s capital, I met Lt Col Prithi Chand, who had occupied Leh overland earlier during winter, a creditable feat. He was a gallant and colourful soldier. We had about 400 men here as against the enemy’s 1,300. There were two companies of 2/4 Gorkhas and some battered remnants of the Jammu and Kashmir State Forces who had been withdrawn from Pakistan and Kargil.
The garrison was woefully short of supplies and clothing. Cooking and boiling water at this height was a problem. Men were worried about their families from whom they had received no mail for months and we had cases of septic wounds due to lack of medical facilities. Yet, even in these circumstances, there were examples of individual gallantry.
I also met here Major Hari Chand who was commanding a company of 2/8 Gorkhas. He was a fearless soul, having many successful actions to his credit. Our garrison had only small arms and little ammunition. The enemy had, however, hauled up a 37-inch howitzer and placed it at a commanding position which Hari Chand promised to neutralize. He caught the enemy napping, raided this position, destroyed the gun and killed its crew who were fast asleep in a shelter by its side. For this and other acts of gallantry, and having seen the conditions in which he was operating, I initiated a recommendation, to General Thimayya, who supported it to higher authorities for the award of Mahavir chakra which he was duly granted.
Subedar Bhim Chand was at Tharu, about twelve miles beyond Leh where I met him. He had become a hero with the local villagers as he had saved their villages from many enemy onslaughts. One day he heard that his wife had died in his village, leaving behind two children. He was very upset to hear this news and asked for short leave to settle his domestic affairs. The leave, of course, was promptly sanctioned but within minutes the villagers at Tharu, a military stronghold, flocked around their saviour and asked him to postpone his departure as they feared another enemy attack and as they thought only he could save them.
He was on the horns of a dilemma: should he go to his children, who had lost their mother or should he remain at his post, in a critical situation, and save many innocent people here? After much deliberation, and with a lump in his throat, he decided to stay on in Tharu, for a few days more, and stick to his post. And in the ensuing battle, he lived up to the hopes of his admirers. For this devotion to duty and other acts of bravery, I forwarded to the higher authorities a recommendation for the grant of Vir Chakra which he was awarded.
After living with this beleaguered garrison and seeing their grim situation and the gallant way they were standing up to it, 1 returned to HQ 19 Division by air and reported to Maj Gen Thimayya what I had seen.
Ramban Kidnappings
Two young Dogra girls, Sita and Sukhnu, were abducted from village Sumbal near Ramban by some Bakarwals. When their father appealed for assistance to Lt Col Ranbir Singh, MC, the Commanding Officer of a Rajput Battalion located near Banihal, he, in his chivalrous attitude, readily rose to the occasion and detailed a party of soldiers to bring back the girls from wherever they were. In their quest, they came into clash with armed Bakarwals and without retrieving the girls were apprehended themselves.
An inquiry was then ordered by Delhi to bring to surface all facts in this case and I was appointed its President. Abdullah did not cooperate with this court in many ways. We had difficulty in getting some witnesses.
Abdullah tried to make a political issue out of this case. He threatened to resign and warned Nehru that unless stern action was taken against a group of Indian troops (on charges which were never proved), ‘the repercussions on the population of Kashmir would be serious.’ This was his favourite argument but Government of India earned on the inquiry all the same.
It was alleged these two girls had been abducted from their village, moved from pillar to post on foot over the Pir Panchal range, and ‘married’ to several Bakarwals in turn during the last few months. I also understood that one Shambhoo Nath had been arrested by Abdullah on a fake allegation and was now under arrest in Srinagar. In those days if Abdullah could level no other plausible charge against men he did not approve, he used to label them as RSS (Rashtriya Sevak Sangh) workers. He could then punish them on ‘secular’ grounds.
We eventually managed to get Shambhoo Nath before us for giving evidence and heard his harrowing tale. He had been President of the National Conference at Verinag and just because he acted as a guide to some Indian troops, in the recent affray, he had lost his ‘importance’ all of a sudden, was labelled as an RSS worker and jailed. He alleged he was made to march bare-footed and shackled. Shambhoo Nath showed me deep marks of the beatings (by the authorities) he had received on various parts of his body so that he should be compelled to confess imaginary crimes he had never committed. History seemed to have receded back to mediaeval times. I reported this case to Sardar Patel informally.
When Shambhoo Nath was eventually released, he was afraid his life would be in danger in Kashmir. I, therefore, got him a job in a factory near Delhi and slipped him out of Kashmir in a military lorry. I then wrote a scathing report on this case which went through proper channels to Government. I heard that Abdullah approached General Bucher for help. Bucher ignored my report and recommendation and initiated, instead, a case against our Rajput soldiers on various charges. These men were, however, released later for want of evidence. Bucher also tried to be vindictive towards Lt Col Ranbir Singh, MC, Commanding Officer of the Rajputs and Brigadier (later Lt General) Bikram Singh, the Brigade Commander, to placate Abdullah.
Gen Francis Robert Roy Bucher
General Bucher’s appointment as India’s Commander-in-Chief was far from well-received in the Indian Army. Some renowned British officers like Lockhart and Russel had not been appointed to this post perhaps because they were independent and outspoken, Bucher, on the other hand, had a mediocre military record, having commanded nothing much in his career.
I had come from Kashmir to Delhi to attend a conference and was having breakfast with Nehru. After the normal chit-chat, I raised before him, with due apologies, a delicate topic; whether it was proper that Roy Bucher whilst he was India’s C-in-C should occasionally ring up Gracey, Pakistan’s Army Chief, exchange operational information mutually and discuss with him various operational matters over the telephone whilst the two countries were at war.
What kind of a war was being conducted, in which the two opposing Chiefs seemed to be hand in glove? I also asked whether it was correct for Bucher to have resisted an air strike by us against the concentration of a large number of militant Pathans in the Poonch Sector, specially when they were bound to pose a threat to us later if spared then. Whatever the reasons, was it ever fair to spare the enemy in war, when we knew that he would try to kill us instead, if he could. I ended up by saying that I thought Bucher enjoyed little prestige in the Indian Army nor did he wield much influence in the British War Office. What, then, was his function in life, I asked. I also remarked that, if Bucher went to London, as I had heard he was going, on a procurement mission for military equipment, I was sure that as he enjoyed little influence with the British authorities in UK, he would bring back hardly anything we needed.
Nehru took my tirade against Bucher with a pinch of salt and did not encourage any further conversation. He often did that when he did not wish to discuss an unpleasant topic. I heard later that though Bucher did go to UK on an urgent procurement mission (for military equipment) he returned from there almost empty-handed, bringing back with him many ifs and buts. When I asked Nehru, how Bucher had fared in London, he admitted he had not done too well.
When Bucher left and Cariappa became India’s Commander-in-Chief a few months later, this step was universally approved in the Indian Army.
Sheikh’s Interventions
I had quite a rough passage with Abdullah when I found him interfering with the Militia which I commanded. Pressure was put in cases of promotions and discipline.
Prior to the Security Council meeting at which consideration of India’s complaint against Pakistan concerning the situation in Jammu and Kashmir resumes, Fernand van Langenhove (Belgium), President of the Security Council, meets with representatives of both parties in the dispute. (L to R) Mr Van Langenhove; Faris el-Khouri, Syria’s representative on the Council; Sheikh Mohamed Abdullah, President of All-Jammu and Kashmir National Conference and head of the Kashmir State Administration; Ambassador M. A. H. Ispanhani, Pakistan; Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan, Pakistani Minister of Foreign Affairs, and N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, India’s Minister without Portfolio. A UN photograph dated January 15, 1948 taken at Lake Success, UN.
As I brooked no interference, I became a persona non grata with Abdullah. One day a militia soldier had been arrested for a serious crime and was to be tried by a Court-martial whilst I was away to an operational front on an Id day. Abdullah ordered my subordinates through his staff, in my absence to release this man as a part of general amnesty on that auspicious Day. I later heard that the culprit, instead of being given exemplary punishment, as he should have received, was given by Abdullah an assignment in the police. I created much din and noise but it was like crying in the wilderness. No brass hat took any notice of what I said. Politics was reigning supreme in military affairs.
A few days later, a soldier who had been convicted for a certain crime went on hunger strike in protest. Here was a political stunt creeping into the army again. I, therefore, thought I better deal with this sort of tendency without mercy. Accordingly, I gave orders to Lt Col GS Puri, my competent staff officer, that this man, even if he gave up his hunger strike, should be given no food for a day or two thereafter and kept alive on water. It would do him some good if he learnt a lesson the hard way.
In the meantime, while he refused to eat, I made him run around a sports ground with a heavy load on his back, even if he malingered. When this ‘political’ soldier nearly passed out, I was asked by one of Abdullah’s spokesmen to deal with him leniently.
I told him I was only discouraging indiscipline from creeping into our ranks and that no pity need be shown in cases where an example was to be set. But when one decides that principles are more important than propriety, it is not uncommon to be misjudged.
Kishtwar Crisis
In mid-summer. Sheikh Abdullah sent for me and said that according to his information, there was much communal tension in Kishtwar and that I should therefore take a J and K Militia unit composed of a particular community there in order to restore the confidence of the local population.
The medieval-era guns were installed on the main gate of the Kishtwar Deputy Commissioner’s office.
I told him that it was customary for us not to nominate troops by communities in the Indian Army and allotted them only specific tasks; and that as such, I would take with me any troops that were available. I think Abdullah
reported this case to higher military authorities—as if I was doing something wrong—and I was asked to give various explanations. When, however, they heard that a communal tinge was being given to a simple case, they did not interfere with me any further
I understood that Adalat Khan, an ex-Lt Colonel of the Jammu and Kashmir Forces had migrated to Pakistan earlier but had now been recalled by Abdullah and made Administrator of Kishtwar. Mrs Krishna Mehta, who was working in Nehru’s household and whose father lived in Kishtwar gave me a totally different version to that which Abdullah did.
I marched with about a hundred men of the 12 Punjab Paratroopers from Batote and after covering 65 miles in torrential rain reached Kishtwar, in two and a half days. Lt Col (now Brigadier) ‘Kim’ Yadav was commanding a militia battalion there. He was ADC to Lord Louis Mountbatten during 1946-7 and an outstanding officer. I found great dissatisfaction prevailing in Kishtwar, not as painted by Abdullah but to the contrary and that Adalat Khan was certainly not proving to be an ideal administrator.
After taking some immediate and salutary steps through Kim Yadav which restored public confidence, I returned to Srinagar via Pir Panchal. But as it took me 3/4 days to march back, before I reached the Kashmir capital, Adalat Khan had, in the meantime, sent a report to Abdullah, complaining against my visit to Kishtwar and the ‘highhanded’ actions I had taken. He had done this as a defensive measure because his maladministration had been exposed for the first time.
When Abdullah confronted me with this allegation, I told him it was baseless and that I had done nothing which could be termed improper. He, however, sent in an exaggerated report to Nehru, threatening that he could no longer assure him of Kashmir’s continued political support if cases of ‘this’ nature were allowed by India to take place. Also, that some of his ministers were threatening to resign on this issue {sic), Nehru was naturally indignant, not knowing what the facts were, called me down to Delhi forthwith and without hearing my side of the story, said angrily: ‘Seikh Abdullah had conveyed to me the gist of your recent actions in Kishtwar. I just don’t understand. What do you think you are? If you go on like this, you will lose Kashmir for India one day.’
‘But do you know the facts, sir?’ I asked.
‘It is enough for me to know that you have fallen out with Sheikh Abdullah, whatever the circumstances. We cannot afford to be at loggerheads with him. I thought you of all people knew better, he said loudly, fuming with rage. I kept quiet because I thought that if facts were not important and politics was above conscience, I had nothing to say.
‘Why don’t you say something?’ Nehru asked.
I was sulking now and said: ‘Sir, If you don’t want to know facts and have already made up your mind to judge my actions in Kishtwar as wrong, without giving me a hearing, there is no point in my saying anything.’
Nehru was at the point of saying something more when he suddenly left the room in a huff.
The next morning Nehru sent for me again. He now greeted me warmly and asked me to relate to him the details of what I had seen in Kishtwar recently. He seemed a different man. I wonder if someone had spoken to him in the meantime. Anyway, I began by saying that he himself had sent me to Kashmir, at the recommendation of the Jammu and Kashmir Government, on my return from America, for national considerations. As for Kishtwar, I was sent there at Abdullah’s request. I went on to say that I had by personal observation in Kishtwar, found that mismanagement of administration prevailed in that isolated district where many of our service rifles had fallen in the hands of unauthorized individuals who, with these and other weapons, had done much mischief; where several young girls had been abducted forcibly and married to undesirable men; and where many other similar crimes had been committed.
I ended up by saying that I was bringing this and some other cases to official notice so that stern action could be taken lest this state of affairs under Abdullah if not put right, may have a comeback on us one day. I then took this opportunity and related to him many other undesirable activities going on in Kashmir under Abdullah.
Lt Gen BM Kaul
Nehru heard all I had to say with patience. After a long pause he explained to me the various baffling aspects of the Kashmir politics and the need for us to remain friendly with Sheikh Abdullah. He said he was pained to hear what I had to say but, for various practical considerations, there was little he could do in the matter. He then said that the rub of the whole thing was that Abdullah had asked for my removal from Kashmir as he found my presence a hindrance in his work. Nehru said though he felt I was not to blame in any specific way, it was difficult for him to ignore the request of Abdullah, who was, after all, the Prime Minister of Kashmir and with whom I had fallen out.
He said it was easier for him to remove an individual like me than to remove Abdullah.
Nehru reminded me that if an individual came in conflict with the head of a government, it was the individual who usually went. He told me that consequently, it would be necessary for me to be posted away from Kashmir, though I would be kept as near it as possible. He then sent a letter to the Army Chief confirming this decision and sent me a copy. I left Kashmir in October 1948. I had learnt much there in a war which had kept swinging like a pendulum and lived in a political situation with hardly any parallel.
(These passages were excerpted from General BM Kaul’s memoir, The Untold Story, which was published in 1967.)
PARIS — France is bracing for fresh chaos Tuesday with a day of protests planned against Emmanuel Macron’s detested pensions reform, and trade unions calling for a general strike.
Protests last Thursday descended into turmoil with clashes between police and protesters, and scenes of violence across the country. In the wake of the unrest, which resulted in more than 450 arrests, the French president was forced to cancel a state visit by King Charles III amid security concerns.
Public transport, universities, schools and public services are expected to be disrupted again Tuesday. The impact of the industrial action is being felt across all sectors and areas of public life. A rolling strike of waste collectors in Paris has meant that trash is still piled high in parts of the French capital, and a strike at refineries has led to fuel shortages at some petrol pumps.
Despite widespread unrest, the French president pledged last week that he would not backtrack on the pensions reform which raises the age of retirement to 64 from 62, saying it was “necessary” for the country to balance the books of its generous pensions scheme.
The French government sparked outrage when it invoked article 49.3 of the French constitution to pass its pensions reform, in a controversial move that bypassed a vote in parliament it was expected to lose. The government narrowly survived two motions of no confidence in the National Assembly after the controversial move.
Tuesday’s protest could be an indicator of whether Macron’s inflexibility whips up more discontent on the street or whether the protest movement is starting to subside. French police have been accused of using heavy-handed tactics and it is likely that students and pupils will join protests in greater numbers. On Saturday, a man was left in a critical condition after clashes with police at a French water reservoir project.
Stalemate over pensions reform
Ahead of the protests on Tuesday, Prime Minister Elisabeth Borne called for talks with trade unions and announced she would no longer use article 49.3 except when it comes to budgetary measures.
“Obviously there are tensions over the reform, we need to listen,” she told AFP on Sunday. “[We need] to calm the country and give the French some answers promptly.”
A demonstration of Totalenergies striking employees outside the Gronfreville-l’Orcher refinery | Lou Benoist/AFP via Getty Images
However, talks between the government and trade unions over the pensions reforms are at a standstill. Macron has said he is open to discussing a range of issues including working conditions, pay and work-related strain, but not the pensions reform. Trade unions say they would agree to talks only if the government agreed to re-examine the legal age of retirement.
With no clear way out and in the wake of a string of violent incidents over the last weeks, there are fears within the trade unions that France may be facing a socio-political crisis similar to the Yellow Jackets movement that rocked the country in 2018-2019.
Trade union leader Laurent Berger warned Monday that France was in “a total state of tension.”
“There is a common will [with the government] to find an exit for this protest movement and not descend into a madness that might take hold of the country, with violence and resentment,” he warned in an interview with French channel France 2.
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With PhD from the Delhi School of Planning and Architecture (1999) and a post-doctorate from Massachusetts Institute of Technology (2022), Dr Hakeem Sameer Hamdni’sThe Syncretic Traditions of Islamic Religious Architecture of Kashmir (Early 14th –18th Century) filled a huge void that in Kashmir’s architectural history. Design Director at the INTACH Kashmir, his latest book Shi’ism in Kashmir: A History of Sunni-Shia Rivalry and Reconciliation is a daring attempt to probe an issue that no scholar has touched ever. A week after the book release, in a freewheeling interview, Sameer details why he choose the subject and what are the net outcomes for Kashmir
TheNewsCaravan (KL):You are a trained architect with a specialisation in Islamic architecture. You did an excellent book on Kashmir’s medieval architecture that filled a wide gulf after a very long time. What prompted you to get into a very sensitive topic involving Kashmir’s sectarian tensions, an issue that attracted almost no scholar, so far?
HAKIM SAMEER HAMDANI (HSH): That is a question that is asked of me a lot, now that the book has been released. So how do I answer it? Well, let me start by saying that as you rightly pointed out my last book was on the Muslim Religious Architecture of Kashmir. And, it was during that very process of researching, I got interested or maybe intrigued by how our historiography has been used as a conscious tool in framing narratives which project the past as a milieu of religious and sectarian conflict.
This is especially true when we speak about a Shia or a Sunni society during the medieval or even early modern period but then this binary broadly covers how we also perceive Hindu-Muslim relations in the region. But then how historical is this narrative of an antagonistic past?
I do accept that our past is not one which upholds liberal representation, but then the material culture linked with it is replete with examples of what we could call negotiated pragmatism and co-existence. Unfortunately a great deal of our textual history, particularly in the genre of tazkiras (hagiographies) coming as it does from competing centres of power and patronage, often conflates symbols of belonging to a privileged class with religious or sectarian discrimination.
Also, the idea that the book breaches a sort of taboo in our society – a topic which can create divisions is something that I don’t personally agree with. In a way, this ‘let’s not talk about these problematic issues’ assumes that either as a society we are incapable of dealing with sensitive subjects or that as researchers we are so grounded in our own biases and prejudices that the task is virtually unachievable.
I disagree. I am of the view that we have the individual (if not institutional) capacities to as I said in another interview, “historicize or rather contextualize our past in a way that does not seek not-to-hide from differences- but also search, explore for shared similarities- similarities that made us Kashmiris”. That was the origin of a book which engages with a layered past and complex moments of our history with competing interests.
I may be repeating myself here, but to survive as a people, as a civilisation, we need to look at our past with all its dissensions, pain-learn and ensure that we and our future generations will understand and realise the perils of sectarianism, just like communalism are too real and too near to be ignored. We also need to understand that differences will exist and where they exist, they need to be celebrated, not hidden behind a veil of assumed unity and uniformity.
KL:Kashmir’s transition to Islam is well-researched and documented. Would you shed some light on the history and evolution of Shia Islam, or what you call, Shia’ism in Kashmir?
HSH: If I may, I would rather contest this understanding. Yes, we have texts which account for the beginning of Muslim rule in Kashmir. But, this beginning of Muslim presence in Kashmir is still a rather grey area. We have narratives enshrined in texts which came in existence in the sixteenth, seventeenth or even eighteenth century as is the case with Khwaja Azam Dedhmari’s Vaqiati Kashmir, and these texts serve as our only basis of understanding the formative period of Muslim society in Kashmir. So a text like Baharistani Shahi or Tarikh i Kashmir of Malik Haider coming as they do from a Shia space would make us understand that the first Muslim saintly figure of the region Bulbul Shah was a Shia. But then, let us say from the genre of tazkirah, an early account such as Tazkira-i-Airifin of Baba Ali Raina would contest this, and locate early Muslim presence in Kashmir firmly in a Sunni space.
So we have these contesting latter-day texts, some written more than four centuries after the actual event, which forms the basis from which we seek to contextualise the beginning and the nature of Muslim beginning in Kashmir. Academically this has all the making of a grey zone.
Hakim Sameer Hamdani’s book on Kashmir’s sectarian reconcilation being launched in Srinagar in March 2023. KL Image Fayaz Ahmad Najar
Additionally, these texts also seek to firmly locate the beginning of Muslim society in their respective sects. The same is the case of the Nurbaksiyya Sufi order, which emerged in Kashmir during the closure of the fifteenth century. The founder of this order in Kashmir, Mir Shamsuddin Iraqi is seen in most Sunni accounts as the progenitor of Shi’ism in Kashmir, but it is difficult to establish the nature of his Shi’iness. That is why I do write in the introduction that the contours of Shiism during the Sultanate period are not sufficiently explained.
But then my book is not about the medieval period, it explores the nineteenth century instead. So hopefully someone in near future explores these early days of Muslim society in Kashmir beyond modern narratives, which have become frankly repetitive in their narratives.
KL:You briefly talk about revered Shia and Sunni figures. How do you approach how they are represented in histories with miracles directed against the other community?
HSH: Well, I believe that we judge or rather contextualise these events – these miracles in the mizaj of their occurrence not in their objective reality, nor considering our personal beliefs or biases. That has been my approach.
KL: Most of the biased or neutral histories source Kashmir’s sectarian tensions to the 32 years of Chak Rule. There are contested narratives on this. But what is your scholarship revealing because you are a scholar who does not go by hearsay or unsubstantiated events of history?
HSH: Not Chak rule, rather if we were to make an argument for a certain contestation based on the confessional identity of communities it would start during the fag end of the Shahmiri rule. The first recorded case we have of someone seeking to make Kashmir into a single denominational community is that of the Mughal conqueror, Mirza Haider Dughlat. In fact, he proudly states this in his own history, Tarikh-i Rashidi.
But then some of these sectarian contestations that originate in Dughlat’s court make themselves a part of the court politics in the Chak rule also. We have the execution of Qazi Musa during Yaqoob Shah Chak’s brief rule but then even Shia sources; Baharistan as well as Haidar Malik condemn his execution.
Conversely, you have two famous qasidah’s of Baba Dawood Khaki, the principal khalifah of the Suhrawardi saint, Shaykh Hamza Makhdoom, which celebrates Chak rulers, including Yosuf Shah as well as his uncle Husain Shah Chak. Also, we have intermarriage between ruling elites happening all through this period across any perceived sectarian fault line.
Sameer Hamdani book on Kashmir Shia Sunni relations (2023)
A Sunni-centric text, such as the tazkira of Baba Haider Tulmulli writes about two wives of Hussain Shah Chak who were not only Sunnis but also linked in a spiritual line of discipleship to Shaykh Hamza Makhdum. Then again we have the famous case of Habba Khatoon – who is a Sunni, though, like other women poetesses of Kashmir, you cannot locate her in contemporary texts.
So what I am trying to say is yes there are tensions, but then that is not the only history of that period. But, again let me clarify this book is not about medieval Kashmir, I only briefly touch on the period in trying to locate projections of a contested past.
KL:How did the power-play exhibit in the Mughal era of Kashmir after Chak’s were ousted from power? How correct is the notion that the Mughals persecuted Shia Muslims?
HSH: The renowned historian, Irfan Habib does link Akbar and the religious elite at his court with a sectarian, restrictive attitude towards the Shi’a till say around the early 1570s. The execution of Mirza Muqim Isfahani and Mir Yaqub, the envoys sent from Husain Shah Chak to the Mughal court by Akbar can be seen as a part of that attitude. But Kashmir was conquered in 1586 and the emperor proclaimed Din-i-Illahi in 1582. So it was a different Akbar. The conquest of Kashmir does have a certain sectarian undertone but the affair should be seen as part of the gradual process of expansion of centralised authority with vastly superior resources and a borderland region.
The relation between Delhi and Kashmir marks this tension between an expanding centre and a periphery in which, the result occurred on expected lines. Were the Mughals sectarian? No. Despite the bad press that they are getting these days, the Mughals were only interested in one profession ‘rulership’. Their notions of royalty almost overlap with the western notion of the divine right to rule. Jehangir in his comparison between court politics in Istanbul, Isfahan and Agra clearly speaks how unlike in Ottoman Turkey or Safavid Iran, Mughal India was open to both Sunnis and Shias. And, we find presence of Shia subedars or naib-subedars in Kashmir- Iteqad Khan, Abu Nasr Khan, Muzaffar Khan, Zafar Khan Ahsan, Ali Mardan Khan, Ibrahim Khan, Fazil Khan, Hussain Beg Khan, Qawam-ud Din Khan, Abu Mansur Safdar Jung, Afrisiyab Khan.
One should also realise that when the Mughals sought to conquer Kashmir, they were engaged in repeated battles with Kashmiri soldiers – a majority of whom were Shia. We have Jehangir writing about the traders of Kashmir hailing from the Sunni community and the soldiers belonging to the Shia and Nurbakshiyya communities. So in these circumstances, an event like the massacre of the Kashmiri soldier by the Mughals at Macchbawan can be seen as a massacre of Shias because they figured prominently in the Kashmiri army. But that would be a wrong reading. This was a massacre of Kashmiri soldiers seen as a threat to the Mughal Empire who were also Shia.
Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah in prayers somewhere in Kashmir periphery and apparently during a visit
Again in the reign of Shah Jehan, we have the case of Khawja Khawand Mahmud Naqshbandi who was a Sufi shaykh, connected with the imperial family but was nevertheless banished from Srinagar because of his involvement in a Shia-Sunni riot. Also, a major Shia polemical work against the Sunnis, Al Biyaz-i-Ibrhami was authored in Kashmir under the direct patronage of the subedar, Ibrahim Khan. Yes sometimes the Shia would find themselves under restrictive circumstances but this was mostly a result of individual predilections of the subedar or even the emperor. It is only when we come to close to Mughal rule, with its collapse of central authority that the Shia get targeted because of their faith and also face riots.
KL:What was the state of sectarian tensions in the Afghan rule that is usually seen as oppressive across all sects?
HSH: As you said it was oppressive for all, but at certain moments it could and was more oppressive towards the Shia – also the Hindus. But then we also find the presence of a Shia subedar, Amir Khan Jawan Sher and Kifayat Khan. The Qizilbash component in the Afghan is also indicative of Shia presence though non-native.
The only instance of a prominent Kashmiri figure rising in the Afghan court is Mulla Hakim Jawad, whose son Mulla Hakim Azim would then serve as the chief physician at the court of the Sikh subedar, Shaykh Ghulam-ud Din and consequently Dogra ruler, Maharaja Gulab Singh. Also, under Afghans, we find the presence of a substantial contingent of Iranian Shia traders in the city who also patronised the native Shia community. But, like everything else, the Afghan period is a mixed bag for Kashmir and for the Shia, it is more on the oppressive side.
KL:Your book is focussed on nineteenth-century Kashmir. The era was an extension of Sikh rule in a way. What were the factors that led to the reconciliation between the different Muslim sects? How did it happen?
HSH: In the end, it is a gradual realisation that whether we see ourselves as Shia or Sunni, we are equally discriminated against, and seen as outsider Muslims by the court. The Shia-Sunni faultline is detrimental to our Muslim existence. It is a gradual process but once it commences – gradually from the community elite on either side, it does capture the imagination of the religious classes and more importantly the new class of educated Muslim youth. There are tensions on the way, but the Muslim fight against, what is perceived, as Hindu rule forms the basis of an ecumenical movement within the Kashmiri Muslim community.
KL:Who were the major players in the reconciliation process and what were the key events that exhibited the reconciliation?
HSH: There are many players – you could say the initial interaction between Mirwiaz Rasul Shah and Moulvi Haider Ansari did help in toning down the sectarian faultiness within the city to a level where they could be managed. Also individuals from the dynasty of Mufti Qawamuddin, also Aga Sayyid Musavi who is said to have visited revered Sunni shrines of Kashmir, at Char-I Sharif and Dastgir Sahab.
Hakim Sameer Hamdani (author)
But, the figure who, in a way, formalises this process is Khawja Saaduddin Shawl. He does emerge as a visionary, who is working towards the formulation of Muslim political consciousness in Kashmir. In 1873, we had the last major Shia-Sunni riot in the city, and within a decade we saw Shawl working to tone down sectarian tensions in the city while also voicing Muslim grievances, hopes-aspirations. This outreach is positively welcomed by the Shia and the main figurehead who emerges in this engagement on the Shia side is Aga Sayyid Hussain Shah Jalali.
As we move towards the first decade of the twentieth century, we see that Shia elders, Aga Sayyid Husain Jalali and Hajji Jaffar Khan sign the memorandum of grievances authored on behalf of the Kashmiri Muslim community in 1907. Similarly, when after the disturbances in the Sericulture department, the durbar bans the daytime Ashura procession in 1924, Shawl helps Jalali in taking out a daytime procession in defiance of the order. This is the first Shia-Sunni march highlighting Muslim unity and was accompanied by two alams (standards) from the revered shrine of Asar-i-Sharif Kalashpora. The move is reciprocated by the Shia who also participate under Jalali’s leadership in the procession from Khanqah-i-Mualla to Char-i-Sharief.
This coming together of the two communities is also witnessed during the BJ Glency Commission of Inquiry in 1931, when the Shia representative, Mulla Hakim Muhammad Ali completely aligns with the demands of the Muslim Conference. In fact, he argues that the Muslim Conference is the sole representative of Kashmiri Muslims, Shia and Sunni alike.
You also see the involvement of Shia Youth in the formulation leading up to, and then in the Reading Room. We have three brothers, Hakim Ali, Hakim Safadr and Hakim Murtaza who are deeply involved with this process. The three are also involved with the organization of Ali Day at Zadibal, which also saw the representation of Kashmiri Sunnis.
I mean a decade earlier Zadibal would be an area avoided by most Sunnis from the city and now you have this public participation in commemorative events taking place in the heart of a Shia space. And, we have individuals such as Justice Sir Abdul Qadir of Lahore from Anjuman-i-Himayt-ul Islam, Raja Ghazanfar Ali of All India Muslim League.
And, then as we move into the 40s, individuals like Munshi Muhammad Ishaq or Aga Shaukat who become associated with this Muslim voice. And then those countless people who unfortunately are never named in histories, but whose contribution is so essential to any social or political movement.
KL: How did the reconciliation display itself post-1931, even though your scholarly work stops in that era, history, as you know, is continuity and sometimes flat.
HSH: Well as you rightly said the period from 1931 onwards is not a subject of my research but yes if you look at some pivotal moments in Kashmiri history post-47, like the Moi-Muqqadas Tahreek you would find active participation of major Shia figures such as Moulvi Abbas Ansari from Srinagar and Aga Sayyid Yusuf of Budgam. Also, the engagement of various scholars and academicians on various societal or religious issues is very visible.
You also find Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah playing a pivotal role in organising a single Ashura procession in the city – an event which was otherwise marked by rival processions between competing religious families within the Shia community. And, then the 1990s threw altogether new challenges and a new set of responses.
KL: For more than half of the millennium, Persian remained the lingua franca of Kashmir to the extent that the rise of Persian led to Kashmir being called the Iran-e-Sageer. Kashmir produced countless Persian intellectuals and poets. How did this Kashmir-Iran relationship impact the sectarian peace or conflict in history?
HSH: There is a Persian poet, who was Shah Jahan’s poet laureate who is also incidentally buried in Mazzar-i-Shura, Drugjan. A Shia, Qudsi is remembered for his naat in praise of the Prophet, Marhaba Sayyid-Ii-Makki Madaniul Arabi– a naat which was regularly recited on mehfil-i-malud amongst Kashmiri Sunnis. I have been told that occasionally it is still recited.
Similarly, we find that the majalis and lessons of masters such as Muhsin Fani, Ghani Kashmir, Mulla Sateh, Lala Malik Shaheed and countless others were attended by people and aspirants across sectarian identities. Ali Mardan Khan and Zaffar Khan Ahsan, both of Iranian origin are celebrated for the promotion of literature. Their sessions were attended by people across any sectarian or communal faultline and then helped in permeating the Persian language amongst sections of the Kashmiri population. Works on ethics, poetics, grammar and a host of other subjects compiled in Persian were studied and circulated without any bias of sect or sectarian identity. I have seen numerous Shia libraries which include codices of tafsir work in Persian that originate in the Sunni circles. Similar is the case in the field of calligraphy, which emerged as a major art form in the early modern period in Kashmir.
Lahore: The police in Lahore on Thursday booked Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf chief Imran Khan and 400 others on the charges of murder and terrorism during their clash with police personnel during the party’s rally that left one activist dead and scores injured.
This is the 80th case against ousted prime minister Khan registered by the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N)-led coalition government during its 11 months of rule.
Police on Wednesday allegedly killed PTI activist Ali Bilal and injured over a dozen during a crackdown outside Khan’s residence from where they were to take out a pro-judiciary rally.
The police also arrested over 100 PTI workers.
The FIR said 11 police officials were injured in the clash with PTI workers who hurled stones at them.
The FIR said six PTI workers also suffered injuries.
Senior PTI leader Fawad Chaudhry on Thursday said instead of registering an FIR against the policemen and their bosses for killing the PTI worker on the complaint of his family, the police have booked 70-year-old Khan and 400 others in his murder.
Fawad Chaudhry, Farukh Habib, Hammad Azhar, and Mahmoodur Rashid are among other PTI leaders named in the FIR.
The cricketer-turned-politician uploaded the brutal torture of PTI workers on social media and said: “This is what the corrupt and murderous cabal of crooks have wrought on the nation. They have violated our Constitution, fundamental rights, and the rule of law. Innocent, unarmed PTI workers, including women, were targets of police violence and brutality with one worker murdered while in custody.”
The ousted premier asked the party supporters across the country to offer funeral prayers in the absentia of the killed worker.
The PTI had announced that it would register a murder case against Punjab caretaker chief minister Mohsin Naqvi, Interior Minister Rana Sanaullah, Punjab IGP Usman Anwar, and Lahore police chief Bilal Saddique Kamyana.
Meanwhile, the Punjab IGP has formed a two-member committee to conduct an inquiry into the police clash with PTI workers outside Zaman Park.
Police on Wednesday fired tear gas and used water cannons to disperse PTI activists.
The party claimed that its “peaceful” workers were arrested after reports emerged that the provincial capital had been placed under Section 144, banning public gatherings.
After the bloody clashes between police and his party workers, Khan called off the party’s “pro judiciary” rally from his Zaman Park residence to Data Darbar.
Khan said the government wants an excuse to delay the elections in Punjab and for this, it needs dead bodies. “Police have picked up our 100 workers. We will not let the government and its handlers succeed in its nefarious design,” he said.
Last Sunday, police failed to arrest Khan primarily because of the resistance of a large number of PTI workers outside his residence.
Khan has been in the crosshairs for buying gifts, including an expensive Graff wristwatch he had received as the premier at a discounted price from the state depository called Toshakhana, and selling them for profit.
President Dr. Arif Alvi has announced April 30 for elections in Punjab in line with the Supreme Court’s order. The PML-N-led ruling coalition in the Centre has openly declared that the elections will not be held.
The Punjab caretaker government has imposed a ban on public gatherings in Lahore.
