Tag: Unpacked

Targeted killings spark debate within Russian opposition

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Jamie Dettmer is opinion editor at POLITICO Europe.
KYIV — “She’ll say whatever the FSB [Federal Security Service] wants her to say,” said Ilya Ponomarev, a former Russian lawmaker-turned-dissident who now lives in Kyiv.
Discussing who was behind the bombing of a St. Petersburg café earlier this month — which left 40 injured and warmongering military blogger Vladlen Tatarsky dead — the “she” in question was 26-year-old Darya Trepova who, until recently, was an assistant at a vintage clothing store and a feminist activist, and has been accused of being the bomber.
And the St. Petersburg bombing — as well as another carried out against commentator Darya Dugina — has now sharpened a debate within the deeply fractured, often argumentative and diverse Russian opposition, regarding the most effective tactics to oppose President Vladimir Putin and collapse his regime — raising the question of whether violence should play a role, and if so, when and how?
Russian authorities arrested Trepova within hours of the blast, and in an interrogation video they released, she can be seen admitting to taking a plaster figurine packed with explosives into a café that is likely owned by the paramilitary Wagner group’s Yevgeny Prigozhin. On CCTV footage, she can be seen leaving the wrecked café, apparently as shocked and dazed as others caught in the blast.
But Ponomarev says she wasn’t the perpetrator, instead insisting that it was the National Republican Army (NRA) — a shadowy group that also claimed responsibility for the August car bombing that killed Dugina, daughter of ultranationalist ideologue Alexander Dugin. Yet, many security experts are skeptical of the NRA’s claims, as the group has offered no concrete evidence to the outside world.
Still, Ponomarev insists they shouldn’t be doubtful and says the group does indeed exist.
“I do understand why people are skeptical. The NRA must be cautious, and for them, the result is more important than PR about who they are. That’s why they asked me to help them with getting the word out, and whatever evidence they show me cannot be disclosed because that would jeopardize their security.”

But who, exactly, are they? According to Ponomarev, the group is comprised of 24 “young radical activists, who I would say are a bit more inclined to the left, but there are different views inside the group, judging from what I have heard during our discussions” — which have only been conducted remotely.
When asked if any of them had serious military training, he said he didn’t think so. “What they pulled off in St. Petersburg wouldn’t require any, and what was done with Dugin’s daughter? We don’t know the technical details but, in general, I can see how that could have been done by a person without any specific training.”
Yet, security experts say they aren’t convinced that either of the apparently remotely triggered bombings could have been accomplished by individuals without some expertise in building bombs and triggering them remotely — especially when it comes to the attack on Dugina, who was killed at the wheel of her car.
Regardless, the bombings are intensifying discussions within the country’s fragmented opposition.
On the one hand, key liberal figures, including Alexei Navalny, Vladimir Kara-Murza — who was found guilty of treason just last week and handed a 25-year jail term — Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Garry Kasparov and Dmitry Gudkov, are all critical of violence. Although they don’t oppose acts of sabotage.
Alexei Navalny is among those who are critical of violence, though aren’t opposed to sabotage | Kiril Kudryavtsev/AFP via Getty images
“The Russian opposition needs to agree on nonaggression because conflicts and scandals in its ranks weaken us all,” Gudkov, a former lawmaker, said. “We need to stop calling each other ‘agents of the Kremlin’ and find the points according to which we can work together toward the common goal of the collapse of the Kremlin regime,” he added in recent public comments.
Gudkov, along with his father Gennady — a former KGB officer — and Ponomarev became leading names in the 2012 protests opposing Putin’s reelection, and they joined forces to mount an act of parliamentary defiance that same year, filibustering a bill allowing large fines for anti-government protesters.
On the issue of mounting violent attacks and targeting civilians, however, they aren’t on the same page. “There are many people inside the Russian liberal opposition who are against violent methods, and I don’t see much of a reason to debate with them,” Ponomarev told POLITICO. There are times when nonviolent methods can work — but not now, he argues.
Meanwhile, inside Russia, Vesna — the youth democratic movement founded in 2013 by former members of the country’s liberal Yabloko party — led many of the initial anti-war street protests observing the principle of nonviolence, though that didn’t prevent the Kremlin from adding it to its list of proscribed “terrorist” and extremist organizations. Nonviolence is likewise observed by the Feminist Anti-War Resistance (FAR), which was launched by activists Daria Serenko and Ella Rossman hours after Russia invaded Ukraine.
“We are the resistance to the war, to patriarchy, to authoritarianism and militarism. We are the future and we will win,” reads FAR’s manifesto. The organization has used an array of creative micro-methods to try and get its anti-Putin message across, including writing anti-war slogans on banknotes, installing anti-war art in public spaces, and handing out bouquets of flowers on the streets.
Interestingly, scrawling on bank notes is reminiscent of Otto and Elise Hampel in Nazi Germany during the 1940s — a working-class German couple who handwrote over 287 postcards, dropping them in mailboxes and leaving them in stairwells, urging people to overthrow the Nazis. It took the Gestapo two years to identify them, and they were guillotined in April 1943.
But such methods don’t satisfy Ponomarev, the lone lawmaker to vote against Putin’s annexation of Crimea in the Russian Duma in 2014. He says he’s in touch with other partisan groups inside Russia, and at a conference of exiled opposition figures sponsored by the Free Russia Forum in Vilnius last year, he called on participants to support direct action within Russia. However, he was largely met with indifference and has subsequently been blackballed by the liberal opposition due to his calls for armed resistance.
Meanwhile, opposition journalist Roman Popkov — who was jailed for two years for taking part in anti-Putin protests and is now in exile — is even more dismissive of nonviolence, saying he talks with direct-action groups inside Russia like Stop the Wagons, who claim to have sabotaged and derailed more than 80 freight trains.
On Telegram, Popkov mocked liberal opposition figures for their caution and doubts about the St. Petersburg bombing. “The Russian liberal establishment is groaning in fear of a possible ‘toughening of state terror’ after the destruction of the war criminal Tatarsky,” he wrote. Adding, “It is difficult to understand what other toughening of state terror you are afraid of.”
According to Popkov, who is also a member of the Congress of People’s Deputies — a group of exiled former Russian lawmakers — the opposition doesn’t have a plan because it is too fragmented, but “there is the need for an armed uprising.”
However, several of Putin’s liberal opponents, including Khodorkovsky, approach the issue from a more cautious angle, saying that people should prepare for armed resistance but that the time is nowhere near right for launching it — the result would almost certainly be ineffective and end up in a bloodbath.

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( With inputs from : www.politico.eu )

April 21, 2023
The strengths and weaknesses of Volodymyr Zelenskyy

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Jamie Dettmer is opinion editor at POLITICO Europe.
In the weeks leading up to Russia’s invasion, senior Ukraine opposition politicians and former ministers were brimming with frustration. They’d been imploring President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to meet with them — something he’d not done since his landslide election nearly two years before.
They’d also been urging him to boost funding for the country’s armed forces for months, clamoring for Ukraine’s reservists to be called up as America’s warnings of an invasion intensified — an invasion Zelenskyy still thought unlikely. They wanted intensive war-planning, including the drafting and publication of civil defense orders, so people would know what to do when the guns roared.
“Ukraine is trapped with a national leader who does not think strategically,” Lesia Vasylenko, a lawmaker and member of the liberal and pro-European political Holos party, had told me five days before the invasion.
“I think that’s the thing he will be blamed for later. It’s not about knowing everything. It’s about refusing to have in your entourage experts who know what questions to ask, and having advisers who can contradict and challenge you, and we may pay a price for that,” she’d fumed.
Of course, Zelenskyy’s missteps — as Vasylenko and many other opposition lawmakers see them — have since been forgiven, but they have not been forgotten. And these missteps form the basis of their worries for post-war Ukraine. They see a pattern that will become even more troubling when the guns fall silent, arguing that the president’s strengths as a lionhearted wartime leader are ill-suited for peacetime.
War hasn’t done anything to temper Zelenskyy’s impatience with governing complexities or with institutions that don’t move as fast as he would like or fall in line fast enough. He prefers the big picture, ignores details and likes to rely on an inner circle of trusted friends.
But while the comedian-turned-president is being lauded now — even hero-worshipped — by a starstruck West for his inspirational wartime rhetoric, spellbinding oratory and skill at capturing the hearts of audiences from Washington to London and Brussels to Warsaw, Zelenskyy floundered as president before Russia invaded. Few gave him much chance of being reelected in 2024, as his poll numbers were plummeting — his favorability rating was at 31 percent by the end of 2021.

He had promised a lot — probably too much — but achieved little.
“Ukraine has two main problems: the war in the Donbas and the fear of people investing in the country,” Zelenskyy had said shortly after his election win. But his anti-corruption efforts stalled and were unhurried, while his promise to solve the problem of the Donbas went nowhere. And in his early eagerness to clinch a peace deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who declined a sit-down, some criticized Zelenskyy for thinking too much of his powers of persuasion and charisma.
“He thought peace would be easy to establish because all you needed to do was to ‘look into Putin’s eyes’ and talk to him sincerely,” said lawmaker Mykola Kniazhytskyi.
“He became president without any political experience, or any experience in managing state structures. He thought running a state is actually quite simple. You make decisions and they have to be implemented,” Kniazhytskyi told me. And when things went wrong, his reaction was always, it’s “the fault of predecessors, who need to be imprisoned,” Kniazhytskyi said.
But while the comedian-turned-president is being lauded now, he floundered as president before Russia invaded | Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images
Yet, Zelenskyy’s transformation from disappointing peacetime leader to, in the hyperbolic words of French public intellectual Bernard-Henri Lévy, “a new, young and magnificent founding father” of the free world, has been startling.
Even his domestic critics doff their caps to him for his strengths as a superb communicator: His daily addresses to Ukrainians have steadied them, given direction and boosted morale, even when spirits understandably flag. And they acknowledge he likely saved the country by declining U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s offer for “a ride” out of Kyiv.
“He has become a compelling leader,” said Adrian Karatnycky, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and author of the upcoming “Battleground Ukraine: From Independence to the Russian War.” According to Karatnycky, Zelenskyy’s strengths as a communicator match the times. “He’s good at channeling public opinion, but he’s more effective now because the country is much more united and surer about its identity, interests and objectives. He’s still the same guy he was — an actor and performer — but that makes him an ideal war leader because he’s able to embody the public impulse,” he added.
But when normal politics are in play and the public isn’t united, Zelenskyy’s an inconsistent leader who switches the script and recasts the story to chase the vagaries and whims of public opinion. “When the public purpose is clear, he has great strength, and in wartime, he has behind him the absolute power of the state. But when the carriage turns into a pumpkin again, he’s going to have to cope with a very different world,” Karatnycky concluded.
And that world hasn’t really gone away.
Domestic political criticism is mounting — though little noted by an international media still enraptured by Zelenskyy’s charismatic appeal and enthralled by the simple story of David versus Goliath.
Meanwhile, in the Verkhovna Rada — the country’s parliament — frustration is building, with lawmakers complaining they’re being overlooked by a government that was already impatient of oversight before the war and now shuns it almost entirely. Zelenskyy has only met with top opposition leaders once since Russia invaded — and that was nearly a year ago.
“The routine of ministers being questioned by the Rada has been abandoned,” said opposition lawmaker Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze, a member of the European Solidarity party and former deputy prime minister in the previous government of former President Petro Poroshenko.
“Wartime does call for urgent decisions to be taken quickly, and it calls for shortened procedures. And so that’s kind of understandable,” she said. “But we are seeing decisions being increasingly centralized and concentrated in fewer hands, and this is having an impact on the balance of political power, and [it’s] damaging to the system of governance we are trying to develop and the strengthening of our democratic institutions in line with the criteria laid out by the EU for convergence.”
Klympush-Tsintsadze is worried the recent wave of anti-corruption arrests was more an exercise in smoke and mirrors in the run-up to February’s EU-Ukraine summit — and one that might be used as an opportunity to centralize power even further. “If someone thinks that centralization of power is the answer to our challenges, that someone is wrong,” she added. “I think it is important to watch very closely how anti-corruption cases develop, and whether there will be transparent investigations, and whether the rule of law will be closely observed.”
According to Kniazhytskyi, we shouldn’t lose sight of the fact that Zelenskyy is a populist politician and shares the personality-focused flaws of this breed. However, what cheers the opposition lawmaker is how Ukrainian civil society has bloomed during the war, how local self-government has been strengthened because of wartime volunteering and mutual assistance and how some state bodies have performed — notably, the railways and the energy sector.
It is this — along with a strong sense of national belonging forged by the conflict — that will form the foundation of a strong post-war Ukraine, he said.

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( With inputs from : www.politico.eu )

February 21, 2023
Manpower will be crucial for Russia to mount a spring offensive

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Jamie Dettmer is opinion editor at POLITICO Europe.
It appears it’s only a matter of time before the Kremlin orders another draft to replenish its depleted ranks and make up for the battlefield failings of its command.
This week, Norway’s army chief said Russia has already suffered staggering losses, estimating 180,000 Russian soldiers have been killed or wounded in Ukraine since February — a figure much higher than American estimates, as General Mark Milley, chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, had suggested in November that the toll was around 100,000.
But whatever the exact tally, few military analysts doubt Russian forces are suffering catastrophic casualties. In a video posted this week, Russian human rights activist Olga Romanova, who heads the Russia Behind Bars charity, said that of the 50,000 conscripts recruited from jails by Yevgeny Prigozhin’s paramilitary mercenary outfit, the Wagner Group, 40,000 are now dead, missing or deserted.
In some ways, the high Wagner toll isn’t surprising, with increasing reports from both sides of the front lines that Prigozhin has been using his recruits with little regard for their longevity. One American volunteer, who asked to remain unnamed, recently told POLITICO that he was amazed how Wagner commanders were just hurling their men at Ukrainian positions, only to have them gunned down for little gain.
Andrey Medvedev, a Wagner defector who recently fled to Norway, has also told reporters that in the months-long Russian offensive against the Ukrainian city of Bakhmut, former prisoners were thrown into battle as cannon fodder, as meat. “In my platoon, only three out of 30 men survived. We were then given more prisoners, and many of those died too,” he said.
Of course, Wagner is at the extreme end when it comes to carelessness with lives — but as Ukraine’s deadly New Year’s Day missile strike demonstrated, regular Russian armed forces are also knee-deep in blood. Russia says 89 soldiers were killed at Makiivka — the highest single battlefield loss Moscow has acknowledged since the invasion began — while Ukraine estimates the death toll was nearer 400.
Many of those killed there came from Samara, a city located at the confluence of the Volga and Samara rivers, where Communist dictator Joseph Stalin had an underground complex built for Russian leaders in case of a possible evacuation from Moscow. The bunker was built in just as much secrecy as the funerals that have been taking place over the past few weeks for the conscripts killed at Makiivka. “Lists [of the dead] will not be published,” Samara’s military commissar announced earlier this month.

To make up for these losses, Russia’s military bloggers, who have grown increasingly critical, have been urging a bigger partial mobilization, this time of 500,000 reservists to add to the 300,000 already called up in September. President Vladimir Putin has denied this, and Kremlin press spokesman Dmitry Peskov has also dismissed the possibility, saying that the “topic is constantly artificially activated both from abroad and from within the country.”
Yet, last month, Russia’s Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu called for Russia’s army to be boosted from its current 1.1 million to 1.5 million, and he announced new commands in regions around Moscow, St. Petersburg and Karelia, on the border with Finland.
Meanwhile, circumstantial evidence that another draft will be called is also accumulating — though whether it will be done openly or by stealth is unclear.
Along these lines, both the Kremlin and Russia’s political-military establishment have been redoubling propaganda efforts, attempting to shape a narrative that this war isn’t one of choice but of necessity, and that it amounts to an existential clash for the country.
General Valery Gerasimov — the former chief of the defense staff and now the overall commander of Russian forces in Ukraine — said that Russia is battling “almost the entire collective West” | Ruslan Braun/Creative commons via Flickr
In a recent interview, General Valery Gerasimov — the former chief of the defense staff and now the overall commander of Russian forces in Ukraine — said that Russia is battling “almost the entire collective West” and that course corrections are needed when it comes to mobilization. He talked about threats arising from Finland and Sweden joining NATO.
Similarly, in his Epiphany address this month, Patriarch Kirill of the Russian Orthodox Church said, “the desire to defeat Russia today has taken very dangerous forms. We pray to the Lord that he will bring the madmen to reason and help them understand that any desire to destroy Russia will mean the end of the world.” And the increasingly unhinged Dmitry Medvedev, now the deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council, has warned that the war in Ukraine isn’t going as planned, so it might be necessary to use nuclear weapons to avoid failure.
As Russia’s leaders strive to sell their war as an existential crisis, they are mining ever deeper for tropes to heighten nationalist fervor too, citing the Great Patriotic War at every turn. At the Museum of the Defense and Siege of Leningrad, which commemorates the breaking of the German siege of the city in 1944, a new exhibition dedicated to “The Lessons of Fascism Yet to Be Learned” is due to be unveiled, and it is set to feature captured Ukrainian tanks and armored vehicles. “It’s only logical that a museum dedicated to the struggle against Nazism would support the special operation directed against neo-Nazism in Ukraine,” a press release helpfully suggests.
In line with Putin’s insistence that the war is being waged to “de-Nazify” Ukraine, Kremlin propagandists have also been endeavoring to popularize the slogan, “We can do it again.”
At the same time, there are signs that local recruitment centers are gearing up for another surge of draftees as well.
Rumors of a fresh partial mobilization have prompted some dual-citizen Central Asian workers — those holding Russian passports and who would be eligible to be drafted — to leave the country, and some say they’ve been prevented from exiting. A Kyrgyz man told Radio Free Europe he was stopped by Russian border guards when he tried to cross into Kazakhstan en route to Kyrgyzstan. “Russian border guards explained to me quite politely that ‘you are included in a mobilization list, this is the law, and you have no right to go,’” he said.
In order to prevent another surge of refuseniks, Moscow also seems determined to put up further restrictions on crossing Russia’s borders, including possibly making it obligatory for Russians to book a specific time and place in advance, so that they can exit. Amendments to a transport law introduced in the Duma on Monday would require “vehicles belonging to Russian transport companies, foreign transport companies, citizens of the Russian Federation, foreign citizens, stateless persons and other road users” to reserve a date and time “in order to cross the state border of the Russian Federation.”
Transport officials say this would only affect haulers and would help ease congestion near border checkpoints. But if so, then why are “citizens of the Russian Federation” included in the language?
All in all, manpower will be crucial for Russia to mount a spring offensive in the coming months. And Western military analysts suspect that Ukraine and Russia are currently fielding about the same number of combat soldiers on the battlefield. This means General Gerasimov will need many more if he’s to achieve the three-to-one ratio military doctrines suggest are necessary for an attacking force.

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( With inputs from : www.politico.eu )

January 24, 2023