Tag: Knew

  • ‘Lessons have not been learned’: FDA knew of positive test months before latest infant formula recall

    ‘Lessons have not been learned’: FDA knew of positive test months before latest infant formula recall

    [ad_1]

    Reckitt had found Cronobacter sakazakii in a batch of formula made at its Zeeland, Mich., plant, during internal testing conducted in early September. The batch that tested positive was destroyed, but the FDA later determined that not enough cleaning had been done following the positive test. Two batches of formula made right after the contaminated batch would ultimately be recalled on February 20 — more than five months after the products had been distributed nationally, including in Guam and Puerto Rico.

    The revelation that this recall took months to announce comes more than a year after a massive infant formula recall from Abbott Nutrition, renewing questions about FDA’s oversight of formula and whether enough has changed in the wake of this crisis to prevent another one. There have been four formula recalls over Cronobacter contamination in the past year — more formula recalls than there have been in the last decade combined.

    The Reckitt recall in February was relatively small compared to the Abbott recall — which was likely the largest in history — and both FDA and the company maintain there have been no reports of illness related to this incident. For food safety advocates, however, it feels like a test that the agency didn’t pass.

    “It’s stunning that it’s almost identical to what happened in 2021,” said Mitzi Baum, CEO of STOP Foodborne Illness, a group that advocates on behalf of victims of outbreaks, referring to the lengthy timeline from positive test to recall. “Lessons have not been learned.”

    “FDA continues to be reactive,” Baum added. “It’s the internal processes that have not been fixed, if this is happening again.”

    A House oversight subcommittee has scheduled a hearing on the agency’s handling of the infant formula crisis on Tuesday. Food safety advocates are eager for Congress to look into the problems, though they are wary of the issue becoming partisan. The committee also last week sent a letter to top agency officials seeking a trove of documents and communications.

    Reckitt did not respond to multiple requests for comment.

    The FDA, for its part, has over the last year been taking a closer look at formula makers’ own records during food-safety inspections as a response to last year’s incident, which was initially set in motion by reports of four infant illnesses, including two deaths, from Cronobacter infections. FDA officials later found serious food safety violations at Abbott’s Sturgis, Mich., plant, which was shuttered for months for cleaning and upgrades, fueling a national shortage and a major disruption to the market because the plant had once made roughly a fifth of the U.S. supply. The FDA also found Cronobacter in 20 places in the plant, though none of the strains matched the illnesses.

    One of the biggest unanswered questions remaining from the formula crisis of last year is why FDA inspectors had missed major food safety problems at Sturgis, including things like roof leaks — conditions that FDA Commissioner Robert Califf later characterized as “egregious.”

    The agency has not provided a full explanation for why these issues were not found during a routine inspection five months prior to the recall. The FDA also did not heed a detailed warning from a whistleblower about the plant, a revelation that was first reported by POLITICO.

    In the case of Reckitt’s Zeeland plant, FDA inspectors initially “made note” of the positive Cronoacter test in November while they were in the facility for a “limited inspection” that was sparked by a “non-illness” complaint FDA had received related to the plant, the agency said.

    The formula recall didn’t happen, however, until FDA inspectors went back to this plant for a follow up inspection in February — a visit that was scheduled because agency inspectors found food-safety problems when they were in the plant for a routine inspection in July, the agency said.

    It was during this February follow-up visit that inspectors “obtained additional information which, when combined with the positive sample, led to the agency’s concerns about the adequacy of cleaning in relation to the production of these two product lots that are the subject of the recall,” a spokesperson said.

    The FDA determined the plant did not perform a sufficient “sanitation break” — an industry term for a thorough cleaning — to essentially make sure all food contact surfaces were properly sanitized after the contamination.

    The FDA said it didn’t follow up more fully on the issue in November because it was a “limited inspection” and the company was still investigating the root cause of the contamination when inspectors were there.

    Food safety experts POLITICO spoke with described the agency’s timeline as “baffling” and “inexcusable” and said the fact that the company was still investigating shouldn’t have prevented further action from the agency.

    The FDA, for its part, said that inspections provide “only a single snapshot in time of the operations, preventive controls, and compliance at a firm. The firm ultimately has a responsibility to implement a constant system of sanitation and food safety controls to produce a safe product in compliance with FDA regulations.”

    FDA declined a request for an interview about the agency’s timeline of its oversight of infant formula.

    “They need to do better,” said Sarah Sorscher, deputy director of regulatory affairs at the Center for Science in the Public Interest. Sorscher pointed to the fact that the FDA had waited six months to re-inspect the Zeeland plant after having found significant food safety problems in an earlier inspection last July.

    At that earlier inspection, the Zeeland plant was cited for failing to maintain the building in “a clean and sanitary condition” and for not establishing a full system of process controls “designed to ensure that infant formula does not become adulterated due to the presence of microorganisms in the formula or in the processing environment,” per FDA inspection records. The citations were serious enough to warrant what’s known as an OAI, or official action indicated.

    “If something like that is coming up, FDA should be back in there sooner to ensure that the corrective actions were adequate,” Sorscher said. “That’s a problem.”

    Reckitt said in its recall announcement that the company had “identified the root cause” of the contamination, which was “linked to a material from a third party.”

    “We have taken all appropriate corrective actions, including no longer sourcing this material from the supplier,” the company said in February.

    A spokesperson for FDA argued that the recent uptick in recalls — earlier this month, Perrigo recalled some Gerber formula over the same bacteria — were essentially a sign of an improved system because the recalls were smaller than the historic recall and plant shutdown last year.

    “As part of the FDA’s oversight to ensure safe and nutritious infant formula, the agency’s more recent engagements with manufacturers through inspections and ongoing meetings has limited the scope of these recalls and minimized disruptions to the market,” a spokesperson said. “Compared to the Abbott recall and the temporary closure of the Sturgis facility, the recent recalls are much narrower in scope, only impacting a few weeks of product with no additional facility closures.”

    Following the slew of Cronobacter recalls over the past year, FDA this month wrote to infant formula manufacturers and others in the industry urging them to follow federal safety rules. The agency also asked companies to voluntarily report any positive tests for Salmonella or Cronobacter to the agency, even if the product hadn’t shipped out — something that could have prevented the delayed Reckitt recall.

    FDA officials contend this reporting is also important because positive tests can be an early sign of larger problems in a facility.

    “The FDA remains committed to strengthening the resiliency and safety of infant formula in the U.S., however there are significant gaps in data and authority that we have identified and are seeking support to address,” wrote Susan Mayne, director of FDA’s Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, in a recent op-ed defending the agency’s work on the issue.

    The FDA has determined the agency does not have the authority to require this reporting, and no formula companies have yet said publicly whether they will voluntarily comply with the agency’s request. The agency recently asked Congress for this authority in the Biden administration’s budget request. Asked why the agency did not request this authority earlier, a spokesperson said the agency’s “thinking on this need evolved following our investigation at Sturgis and other facilities.”

    FDA said in a statement that it lacks the authority under federal law to mandate the notification unless the product has been shipped. “Congress alone can change that provision, not the FDA,” the spokesperson said.

    Some consumer advocates, however, disagree with the agency’s assertion that it doesn’t already have this authority.

    Thomas Gremillion, director of food policy at Consumer Federation of America, believes FDA’s lawyers are interpreting the law far too narrowly, essentially concluding that inspectors can have access to testing records only when they are physically present, not upon request, or otherwise.

    “Consumer groups support expanding FDA’s authority to require infant formula pathogen testing records, but it would be nice if FDA just used its existing authority,” Gremillion said.

    The FDA has insisted repeatedly the agency does not have the authority to mandate this reporting and that Congress must change the law.

    A spokesperson for FDA said that the statutory language Gremillion is looking at “identifies a manufacturer’s obligation to retain records and provide those on request, not to the manufacturer’s obligation to proactively notify the agency of a possibly adulterated or misbranded product.”

    Gremillion said he doesn’t accept the agency’s interpretation of the law and has raised this issue directly with top officials over the past several months, he said.

    “They have the authority to tell the plants to hand over their testing records,” he said. “FDA has bent over backwards to interpret the law in a way that justifies the inaction.”

    [ad_2]
    #Lessons #learned #FDA #knew #positive #test #months #latest #infant #formula #recall
    ( With inputs from : www.politico.com )

  • Asim Riaz recalls the day Sidharth Shukla died, says ‘knew it before..’

    Asim Riaz recalls the day Sidharth Shukla died, says ‘knew it before..’

    [ad_1]

    Mumbai: A total of 16 seasons of popular television reality show Bigg Boss ended successfully but the most talked ever would probably be the 13th one. The two arch-rivals of Bigg Boss season 13 Sidharth Shukla and Asim Riaz were the main entertainers of the audiences and fans still share their moments and tiffs on various social media platforms. The arch-enemies inside Bigg Boss’s house turned out to be good friends outside later.

    Asim Riaz has been seen often sharing with fans and media about his relationship with Sidharth Sukhla. The first runner-up of the BB 13 has recently made a shocking statement about the death of Sidharth Shukla.

    jjj

    In an interview with Siddharth Kannan, Asim said, “He came in my dream bro, I swear. I knew it before (it happened). I had a call from one of my cousins, Ruhaan called me up, usne mujhe bola bhai news on karna (He asked me to switch on the news), he didn’t tell me because he knows how emotional and how sensitive I am.”

    “I have spent 140 days with him in that house and I was really connected because I had no friend outside and aisa connection kisi se hua hi nahi kabhi bhai, matlab ladna toh 4-4 din, hasna toh 4-4 din (I have never had such a connection where we fought for 4 days continuously and then laughed continuously for 4 days),” he added.

    Despite sharing a good bond with Sidharth Sukhla later, Asim Raiz  still claims that his friend’s victory was rigged. He maintained that he was far more deserved than the late Sidharth Shukla.

    In the same interview with Siddharth Kannan, Asim said,  “Mere dauraan unhone kya kiya (during my trip what they did), since they didn’t want me to win, haanji bhai aaj hum online voting khol denge 15 min ke liye, jitana hai jitao jisko (they opened online voting and said, make whoever you want to win). Just say you don’t want to see me win, and it’ll be OK. You made it so plain that we had to think you did whatever you did, and I was like, alright.”

    It seems that Asim Riaz is still holding grudges against the Bigg Boss management but at the same time, he feels bad for losing one of his good friends. He was among the first to arrive at the Cooper Hospital in Mumbai, where Sidharth’s body was brought for a postmortem. Sidharth Sukhla died  on September 2 in 2021. 

    [ad_2]
    #Asim #Riaz #recalls #day #Sidharth #Shukla #died #knew #before.

    ( With inputs from www.siasat.com )

  • ‘We Knew We Were on the Precipice’

    ‘We Knew We Were on the Precipice’

    [ad_1]

    Tom Sullivan, deputy chief of staff for policy, Department of State: We were at the COP in Glasgow [on November 2] and met with President Zelenskyy — the secretary had to brief him on our intelligence that we had strong indications that Russia was preparing for a large-scale invasion of Ukraine.

    Antony Blinken: The two of us, sitting almost knee-to-knee in a room on the margins of the summit meeting. It was very stark, very palpable. He took the information very stoically.

    Tom Sullivan: They were clearly struck by how candid our assessment was. That was notable.

    Antony Blinken: [That was] one of the most powerful moments for me.

    Laura Cooper: As far back as November, we were gearing up in a significant way to make sure we were monitoring the situation incredibly closely, understanding the intelligence, gearing up to support Ukraine and reinforce our allies. Secretary [Lloyd] Austin put us on a vigorous battle rhythm — we were providing updates every single morning, at first it was by 7:30 a.m., and then it was by 6:30.

    Amb. Michael Carpenter: I remember arriving in Vienna in late November of 2021, and most of my colleagues were talking about the quote unquote deliverables for the ministerial [OSCE’s decision-making body]. I remember being incredulous that this was what most people here at the organization were talking about, because all I wanted to talk about was the risk of a full-blown war in Europe that could be weeks away. It all seemed surreal — not that climate change isn’t crucially important for all of us, but it seemed we were on the precipice of this massive geopolitical catastrophe. There weren’t enough people convinced of the gravity.

    Jake Sullivan: I was working in the White House when Crimea unfolded and the “little green men,” the early hours of confusion and fog of war. We had the benefit of being able to learn from that experience — to learn from the experience of the initial invasion into the Donbas in 2014, to really study the Russian playbook going as far back as Georgia. We have the benefit of the early warning of the intelligence, to make sure that we would not be caught on our back foot, but rather we’d be on our front foot — and pushing Russia in the information space onto their back foot.

    Victoria Nuland, under secretary for political affairs, Department of State: Because I had seen our best efforts to forestall a violent choice by Putin fail in ’14, I was more prepared than many for the fact that he would do it again this time.

    Avril Haines: We were increasingly accumulating a picture that made clear: “Yes, this was a real option that they were considering,” and as we were helping the policy community understand that, the Boss was saying, “OK, Tony, Jake, you guys, you need to go out there, and start talking to our partners and allies. We need to see if there’s any opportunity for us to shape what might happen.”

    Gen. Mark Milley: There’s a series of briefings that we have with our NATO allies all through the fall. DNI Haines, Director Burns and myself all talking with our counterparts to be able to set that context.

    Avril Haines: What I remember before the NATO engagement [in November] was them coming back and saying to the Boss: “They’re really skeptical,” like, “We’re going out there, and they don’t think that Putin is going to invade,” and him turning around and saying, “OK, you need to get out there. We need to start sharing intelligence and you have got to help them see that this is a plausible possibility, because that’s what’s going to help us to engage them in a way that allows us to start planning.”

    Victoria Nuland: Everybody at the beginning was relatively skeptical — with the exception of the Canadians and the U.K., who were seeing the same intelligence that we were seeing because they’re Five Eyes — that he would actually take this step.

    Lt. Gen. Scott Berrier: The Five Eyes is the oldest intelligence collaboration network that we have — we have very close partners with Canada, Australia, Great Britain and New Zealand. We also wanted to reach out to other traditional partners — France, Germany, other members of NATO. A portion of that was about convincing them of the intelligence we had and what we thought. In other cases, it was more collaboration on the intelligence they had and what they saw.

    Liz Truss: We were sitting on very serious, good intelligence, but — for whatever reason — that wasn’t necessarily the shared view of what was going to happen. Our allies had a different view.

    Dame Karen Pierce: We knew that the French and Germans had the same reports that we had. We were puzzled by their insistence that he would not invade. When I asked the Germans, they said they wanted to keep an open mind. Scholz has said it — they just were wrong. They hoped for the best.

    John Sullivan, U.S. ambassador to Russia, Moscow: People had a hard time believing that there was going to be a major land war in Europe. “Yeah, maybe it’ll be like 2014-15 — there’ll be some ‘little green men,’ and there’ll be a minor incursion here, etc.” I was saying: “No. What they’re massing is not what happened in 2014-15. This is a World War II-style, or 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia-style military operation.” That’s what they had trouble wrapping their minds around.

    Liz Truss: I don’t think any of us wanted to believe.

    Jake Sullivan: I was very understanding, because an invasion of this magnitude was out of character for Putin, who had specialized in more hybrid, more limited military operations. It was something with grave consequences for the security of Europe and so hard to immediately wrap one’s mind around.

    Jon Finer: It was, in many ways, a highly illogical and irrational thing for [the Russians] to do for all the reasons that have played out ever since and in the enormous cost that they have paid for, frankly, very little military gain.

    Amb. Michael Carpenter: Did he really think he could occupy all of Ukraine? It still seems incredible today he could think he could achieve an occupation of a country of 44 million people, with whom he was at war for many, many years, who had no love lost for Russia. We were warning Russia both publicly and privately that if it invaded Ukraine that it would be a massive strategic miscalculation, using exactly those words.

    Vice Adm. Frank Whitworth: Wherever we went, I’ve got a book that has the “Big Green Map” in it.

    Amanda Sloat, senior director for Europe, National Security Council, White House: That map has taken on mythical status.

    Vice Adm. Frank Whitworth: I don’t go anywhere without it; the chairman wouldn’t go anywhere without it. The map — even though it’s two-dimensional — becomes a great source of intelligence fusion, the prop you need analytically to tell the tale.

    John Kirby: It was a classic military topographical map — it showed a general sense of the topography of Ukraine, particularly those areas where we knew operations were going to be conducted, and it gave us a working-level knowledge every day of where the positions were, where the major units were, what kind of units they were, where and when they were moving. It was updated routinely to reflect the battlefield positions.

    Amanda Sloat: The map was generally brought out in Principals Committee meetings, spread out on the table, and then taken away. It was used in the Oval Office for briefings with the president. I never got an up-and-close look, because it was whisked in and out, but it speaks to the degree to which people wanted to understand the details of how this was going to play out.

    Colin Kahl, under secretary of Defense for policy, Pentagon: There were debates in the fall about how much support was required, because we didn’t want to inadvertently speed up the Russian clock, incentivize Putin, or give him a pretext to make a decision he had not made. Us leaning too far forward could create dynamics either within the alliance or as we were trying to build world opinion against the Russians that made us look like we were the provocateurs.

    Amanda Sloat: It got to the point where we had to say to the Europeans, “Fine, we can agree to disagree analytically, but let’s start planning as if we are right. If we are right, then we’re in a good place because we’ve got all our planning. If you’re right, that’s the best possible outcome because then there’s not going to be an invasion — at best, this will have just been a waste of time.”

    Jon Finer: We eventually brought people around by bombarding them with information that you could not ignore.

    [ad_2]
    #Knew #Precipice
    ( With inputs from : www.politico.com )