LUXEMBOURG — Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba on Monday implored EU foreign affairs ministers to move faster on their promises to supply Kyiv with ammunition. But his plea came as officials were given new details showing the EU still has a long way to go to meet its lofty pledges.
According to several diplomats, Kuleba — who addressed a meeting of foreign ministers in Luxembourg via video link — was critical of the slow pace of the EU in delivering ammunition and missiles as part of a plan to provide 1 million shells in the next 12 months as Ukraine fights off Russia’s invasion.
The plan has already been endorsed by EU leaders but, when it comes to the technical details, has only been partially agreed upon by member states, which are still discussing the so-called track two of the scheme, which involves the joint purchase of ammunition.
The bone of contention is a legal one about exemptions for companies based outside the EU in the supply chain of the defense companies involved in the plan, but in the background doubts also remain as to whether the EU defense industry can really deliver all of these shells.
Kuleba on Monday “repeated that Ukraine needs desperately the ammunition to stand against the Russian attacks, and also to organize the counterattack,” Margus Tsahkna, the foreign minister of Estonia, which put forward the ammo plan, told POLITICO. “And ammunition is crucial.”
The problem is not only the speed of the EU in delivering the ammo, but also the quantity. The plan is being funded by a pot of money called the European Peace Fund, which partially reimburses the member states for ammo and missiles. That cash, meant to help provide ammunition quickly, comes from the so-called track one of the plan — worth a total of €1 billion — which has already been fully agreed upon. EU top diplomat Josep Borrell, speaking to journalists Monday, said that “we have received requests for reimbursement for €600 million.”
Yet according to three diplomats, not all the material that member states want reimbursing for has actually been delivered. Of the €600 million that Borrell mentioned, €180 million was for the provision of 1,080 missiles (six of which have not yet been reported as delivered) and the rest of the money was for 41,000 pieces of ammunition, of which 28,000 have not been reported as delivered, the diplomats said.
Those numbers are well short of 1 million.
Kuleba stressed “that if there is one priority, and if it’s a single burning issue, this is weapons delivery, in particular ammunition … he also asked for not being hesitant on delivering the aircraft and other modern pieces of military technology,” Slovakia’s foreign minister, Rastislav Káčer, told POLITICO. “He was pushy, politely,” Káčer added.
Borrell tried to offer reassurance on the speed of the EU decision-making process, saying: “There has been some disagreement but the work continues. We are not waiting for the legal document to be finished to start working. The work continues and everything is being prepared,” he said at a press conference after the meeting.
Diplomats reckon it’s a matter of days, likely Wednesday, before track two of the plan will be finalized.
“The truth is that there is not satisfaction about how we’re delivering on track one, in the quantity and the speed,” Káčer said. “We can do more, we can scratch more. Slovakia is trying. We are putting everything we have in the stockpiles.”
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( With inputs from : www.politico.eu )
The Baltic states of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia are demanding an explanation from Beijing after China’s top envoy to France questioned the independence of former Soviet countries like Ukraine.
Lu Shaye, China’s ambassador to France, said in an interview on Friday with French television network LCI that former Soviet countries have no “effective status” in international law.
Asked whether Crimea belongs to Ukraine, Lu said that “it depends how you perceive the problem,” arguing that it was historically part of Russia and offered to Ukraine by former Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev.
“In international law, even these ex-Soviet Union countries do not have the status, the effective [status] in international law, because there is no international agreement to materialize their status as a sovereign country,” he said.
The comments sparked outrage among Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia — three former Soviet countries.
Latvian Foreign Minister Edgars Rinkēvičs said in a tweet that his ministry summoned “the authorized chargé d’affaires of the Chinese embassy in Riga on Monday to provide explanations. This step is coordinated with Lithuania and Estonia.”
He called the comments “completely unacceptable,” adding: “We expect explanation from the Chinese side and complete retraction of this statement.”
Margus Tsahkna, Estonia’s foreign minister, called the comments “false” and “a misinterpretation of history.”
Gabrielius Landsbergis, Lithuania’s foreign minister, shared the interview on Twitter with the comment: “If anyone is still wondering why the Baltic States don’t trust China to “broker peace in Ukraine,” here’s a Chinese ambassador arguing that Crimea is Russian and our countries’ borders have no legal basis.”
Kyiv also pushed back strongly against the ambassador’s comments.
“It is strange to hear an absurd version of the ‘history of Crimea’ from a representative of a country that is scrupulous about its thousand-year history,” Mykhailo Podolyak, an adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s office, said in a tweet on Sunday. “If you want to be a major political player, do not parrot the propaganda of Russian outsiders.”
EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell called the remarks “unacceptable” in a tweet on Sunday. “The EU can only suppose these declarations do not represent China’s official policy,” Borrell said.
France in a statement on Sunday stated its “full solidarity” with all the allied countries affected, which it said had acquired their independence “after decades of oppression,” according to Reuters. “On Ukraine specifically, it was internationally recognized within borders including Crimea in 1991 by the entire international community, including China,” a foreign ministry spokesperson was quoted as saying.
The foreign ministry spokesperson also called on China to clarify whether the ambassador’s statement reflects its position or not.
The row comes ahead of a meeting of EU foreign ministers in Luxembourg on Monday, where relations with China are on the agenda.
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( With inputs from : www.politico.eu )
It’s the rumor inflating the Brussels bubble: The EU’s top executive, Ursula von der Leyen, could be crossing town to run NATO.
The rationale makes sense. She has a good working relationship with Washington. She is a former defense minister. And as European Commission president, she has experience working with most NATO heads of government. Plus, if chosen, she would become the alliance’s first-ever female leader.
The conversation has crested in recent weeks, as people eye current NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg’s pending exit at the end of September.
Yet according to those inside NATO and at the Commission, the murmurings are more wish-casting than hints of a pending job switch. There is no evidence von der Leyen is interested in the role, and those in Brussels don’t expect her to quit before her first presidential term ends in 2024.
The chatter is similar to the rumblings around Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte, a long-serving leader who checks every box but insists he doesn’t want the job.
The speculation illustrates how much Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has changed NATO — and who can lead it. The war has put a new spotlight on the alliance, making the job more politically sensitive and high-profile than in the past. And allies are suddenly much more cautious about who they want on the podium speaking for them.
In short, the chatter seems to be people manifesting their ideal candidates and testing ideas rather than engaging in a real negotiation.
“The more names, the clearer there is no candidate,” said one senior European diplomat, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss internal alliance dynamics.
A second senior European diplomat agreed: “There is a lot of backroom gossip,” this person said, “but no clear field at this stage.”
The (very) short list
The next NATO chief, officials say, needs to be a European who can work closely with whoever is in the White House.
But that’s not all. The next NATO chief needs to be someone who backs Ukraine but is not so hawkish that it spooks countries worried about provoking Russia. And the person has to have stature — likely a former head of state or government — who can get unanimous support from 31 capitals and, most importantly, the U.S.
There are several obstacles to Usula von der Leyen’s candidacy | Odd Andersen/AFP via Getty Images
That’s not a long list.
Von der Leyen is on it, but there are several obstacles to her candidacy.
The first is simply timing. If Stoltenberg leaves office in the fall as scheduled, his replacement would come into the office a year before von der Leyen’s term at the Commission ends in late 2024. She may even seek another five-year term.
“I don’t think she will move anywhere before the end of her mandate,” said one senior Commission official, who also spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss internal matters.
Speculation is rife that the current NATO chief may be asked to stay on, at least for a little while longer, to allow for a candidate such as von der Leyen to come in at a later stage.
“If Stoltenberg is prolonged until next summer, Ursula von der Leyen’s candidature would look logical,” said a third senior European diplomat.
But in an interview with POLITICO last week, Stoltenberg appeared keen to go home. The NATO chief has been in the job for over eight years, the second-longest tenure in the alliance’s seven-decade history.
Asked about gossip that he may stay on, the secretary-general shot back sarcastically: “First of all, there are many more questions in the world that are extremely more important than that.”
“My plan is to go back to Norway,” he added, “I have been here for now a long time.”
The alliance is divided on the matter. Some countries — particularly those outside the EU — would prefer a quick decision to avoid running into the EU’s own 2024 elections. The fear, a fourth European diplomat said, is that NATO becomes a “consolation prize in the broader European politics” as leaders haggle over who will run the EU’s main institutions.
Another challenge for von der Leyen would be Germany’s track record on defense spending — and her own record as Germany’s defense minister.
A decade ago, NATO countries pledged to move toward spending 2 percent of their economic output on defense by 2024. But Germany, despite being Europe’s largest economy, has consistently missed the mark, even after announcing a €100 billion fund last year to modernize its military.
From the German government’s perspective, keeping von der Leyen at the helm of the Commission might be a bigger priority than NATO | Kenzo Tribuillard/AFP via Getty Images
Additionally, some observers say von der Leyen bears some responsibility for the relatively poor state of Germany’s defenses.
From the German government’s perspective, keeping von der Leyen at the helm of the Commission might also be a bigger priority than NATO — even if she comes from the current center-right opposition. The EU executive is arguably more powerful than the NATO chief within Europe, pushing policies that affect nearly every corner of life.
Predictably, the Commission is officially dismissive of any speculation.
“The president is not a candidate for the job” of NATO secretary-general, a Commission spokesperson told POLITICO on Monday. “And she has no comment on the speculation.”
Who else can do it?
As with von der Leyen, it is unclear if some other names floated are actually available.
Dutch Prime Minister Rutte has dismissed speculation about a NATO role, telling reporters in January that he wanted to “leave politics altogether and do something completely different.”
A spokesperson for the prime minister reiterated this week that the his view has not changed.
Insiders, however, say the Dutch leader shouldn’t be counted out. In office since 2010, Rutte has significant experience working with leaders across the alliance and promotes a tight transatlantic bond.
The Netherlands is also relatively muscular on defense — it has been one of Europe’s largest donors to Ukraine — but not quite as hawkish as countries on the eastern flank.
“Rutte’s name keeps popping up,” said the second senior European diplomat, “but no movement on this beyond gossip.”
Others occasionally mentioned as possible candidates are Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas and Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, and to a lesser extent British Defense Secretary Ben Wallace, Canadian Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland, Romanian President Klaus Iohannis and Slovak President Zuzana Čaputová.
But despite the gossip, officials acknowledge many of these names are not politically feasible at this stage.
Kallas, for instance, is perceived as too hawkish. And conversely, Canada and some southern European countries are viewed within the alliance as laggards on defense investment. Then there’s the fact that some capitals would oppose a non-EU candidate, complicating a Wallace candidacy.
As a result, a senior figure from a northern or western EU country appears the most likely profile for a successful candidate. Yet for now, who that person would be remains murky. Officials do have a deadline, though: the annual NATO summit in July.
“Either a new secretary general will be announced,” said a fifth senior European diplomat, “or the mandate of Jens Stoltenberg will be prolonged.”
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( With inputs from : www.politico.eu )
BRUSSELS — The EU is finalizing a €2 billion deal to jointly restock Ukraine’s dwindling ammunition supplies while refilling countries’ stocks, according to documents obtained by POLITICO.
The plan has two major elements.
First, the EU will spend €1 billion to partially reimburse countries that can immediately donate ammunition from their own stockpiles. Secondly, countries will work together to jointly purchase €1 billion in new ammunition — the idea being that together they can negotiate bigger contracts at a lower price-per-shell.
EU ambassadors will discuss the proposal — prepared by the EU’s diplomatic wing, the European External Action Service — during a meeting on Wednesday.
The scheme — which POLITICO first reported on earlier this month — has come together rapidly in recent weeks in response to Ukraine’s pleas for more ammunition, specifically the 155-millimeter artillery shells it desperately needs to both hold territory and launch a spring counteroffensive.
And the figures, one of the documents notes, respond “to a specific request made by the Ukrainian minister of defense.”
The numbers are stark.
Estonia, which helped start the conversation in February about how the EU could jointly help fill a looming munitions shortage, has estimated that Russia is burning through 20,000-60,000 shells per day while Ukraine is trying to judiciously only use between 2,000 and 7,000.
Covering that figure will not come easy — or cheap.
Thus far, EU countries have only provided Ukraine with 350,000 155-millimeter shells in total, with the EU spending €450 million on partial reimbursements, said one EU official, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss the sensitive topic. But the official pegged the cost for each new shell at €4,000, meaning costs are growing.
To cover both the losses of countries dipping into their stockpiles and funding new ammunition buys, the EU is tapping the so-called European Peace Facility. The little-known fund sits outside of the EU’s normal budget, giving officials the flexibility to use it to cover weapons purchases — once a verboten concept within the EU, a self-proclaimed peace project.
Thus far, the facility has been used solely to partially reimburse countries for their weapons donations to Ukraine. Now, documents show countries are willing to funnel an additional €2 billion into the facility — €1 billion to cover some ammunition donations and €1 billion to support joint purchases of replacement shells.
Ukrainian artillerymen in the vicinity of Bakhmut, Donetsk | Ihor Tkachov/AFP via Getty Images
The documents foresee the European Defense Agency, an EU agency meant to better coordinate members’ security efforts, possibly playing a role in coordinating the joint procurement efforts. But individual countries could also help spearhead these negotiations, as long as the country is working with at least two other EU members and not creating competing bids for the shells that drive up prices.
The joint procurement plan covers not just EU countries but Norway as well — as POLITICO first reported — potentially opening the door to some of the money going to non-EU-based companies. Norway, however, which produces ammunition, is already relatively integrated into the EU market.
EU officials are now aiming to get a consensus agreement on the plan during a meeting on Monday of foreign and defense ministers, before getting final sign-off from the 27 EU leaders at a summit in Brussels.
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( With inputs from : www.politico.eu )
Hyderabad: Policing here has changed over the last few years after the formation of Telangana. Technology based practices have completely taken over the traditional beat policing. This project of modernization of policing has been long and co-ercive, with a never ending list of human rights violations carried out by the police in the region.
But these violations are no more rooted in the feudal and nation state structures that were the primary cause of violence in the region post independence. Since the 1990s, it is the transnational demands of globalisation that determined how policing practices are carried out in Hyderabad.
The background
Modernization of policing in India has been a long pending project for the Ministry for Home Affairs (MHA). After the Mumbai terror attacks of 26/11, the MHA along with National Crime Records Bureau began working on several new surveillance projects along with modernization and digitization of policing. The MHA promoted and funded several experiments of policing across the country as part of this exercise.
As a developed region in India, Hyderabad became the testing ground for many of the experiments for digitization. Everything from CCTNS, Automatic Fingerprint Recognition System, Facial Recognition Systems, Operation Chabutra, Stop and Scan searches, cordon searches were all piloted first in Hyderabad before they were expanded across the country.
If you have seen the Hyderabad Police go around with android tablets with the TSCOP application in it, taking photos, imposing fines and verifying your identity details with their 360 degree profile databases, these are not original ideas. The present practices of electronic policing in Hyderabad were borrowed from a tiny eastern european nation Estonia. The Estonian story of IT development is very similar to that of Hyderabad; both regions digitised their economies during Y2K (turn of the millenium) and continued to supply information technology solutions to global markets.
The policing projects along with several other systems like digital identity, land registries, population registries were all ideas that were first experimented in Estonia and then later in Hyderabad in India. Both places have become grounds of experimentation networked via the same investor – World Bank, that promoted these experiments.
Like every year this year too, the Information Technology and Industries Minister of Telangana, KT Rama Rao made his pilgrimage to the World Economic Forum to attract investments into Hyderabad. Investments continue to pour into the region and they are not just because KT Rama Rao is articulate, but because of what he promises the investors in return for the investment – continuous growth with no interruptions from anyone in economic activity and safety for investments.
No bureaucratic hurdles, no union protests, business friendly changes to laws and rules, no local political leaders interrupting infrastructure projects, and complete cooperation of the state make it easy for business activity. A trend that started with the liberalisation of the Indian economy in the 90s has pretty much continued.
Policing in Hyderabad pre and post formation of Telangana
While the investments into the region are important for improving economic and social development, they often come at hidden costs that are not fairly obvious. Many people believe the new policing practices of Indian police like elsewhere in the country are a result of the totalitarian turn of the policing force due to right wing politics, which does not hold true for Hyderabad.
These practices have been imposed on us by various investors and have been continuously confirmed by various commissioners of the Hyderabad Police, who continue to say they are doing their “smart policing” to attract investments into the region. Their goal of a safe Hyderabad is rather a demand for a “brand Hyderabad” to the police department as well. The branding of Hyderabad Police as a “people friendly police” also comes from this demand to meet the global standards, to be equally compared with the likes of New York Police Department, London Metropolitan Police etc.
These interests for CCTVs by the police had multiple applications to it beyond the traditional security angle. The Outer Ring Road project being supported by the Japanese International Cooperation Agency(JICA) in 2009 also supported implementation of Intelligent Transportation Systems which included Electronic Toll Collection Systems, CCTVs and Automatic Traffic Counters for Traffic Management.
apan was offering us low interest rate loans to help us build the Outer Ring Road and also give Japanese technology assistance to install various technology systems from Japanese firms. Several companies demonstrated these technologies to the Hyderabad team that visited Japan. In doing this JICA has ensured we buy electronic equipment from Japanese companies with “yen” loans provided by them, essentially helping find new customers for japanese firms and Hyderabad was getting “developed”.
The CCTVs installation didn’t really progress at the pace it probably should have because of various reasons including uncertainty within day to day governance with the death of the then (late AP) Chief Minister YS Rajashekar Reddy. By Feb 21st, 2013, another bomb blast in public shopping areas of Dilsukhnagar had forced the police to push for amendments to the Public Safety Act of 2013.
The Public Safety Act mandated every shop establishment to install a CCTV camera and every police commissionerate to maintain a CCTV unit to monitor them. The plan to implement Intelligent Transportation Systems for Hyderabad traffic was also going nowhere, so JICA was asked for further assistance in 2014 for implementing Intelligent Transportation Systems across Hyderabad Metropolitan Area and not just ORR.
Multiple projects
Even though the Public Safety Act was amended in 2013 and plans for implementation of CCTVs across Hyderabad were being made for traffic management, these were nowhere close enough for what Hyderabad Police wanted. To their rescue came another Japanese company NEC Japan which offered to create Safer Cities, by providing facial recognition cameras. NEC Corporation is a global giant when it comes to biometrics, they have been involved with every major policing organisation to provide them tools for fingerprint scanning to facial recognition systems. Hyderabad Police also used their “Nenu Saitam/Community CCTV” scheme to force CCTVs in every apartment and neighbourhood citing the Public Safety Act of 2013, even though the Act makes it only for shops and establishments to mandatorily install CCTVs.
It is important to understand the global economic relations that have forced intrusive forms of technologies on us, but beyond economics there is also the geopolitics component. India is not only importing models from the west, but also the east specially from countries like Singapore which was always our “model state”. The India-Japan cooperation is also strategically important with the Indian security establishment’s security risks to procure CCTV or any electronic equipment from China. This has also been an important issue with the tendering process around the National Facial Recognition System, where foreign institutions were being favoured and domestic companies were opposing the move.
The problem with the current setup of CCTVs, facial recognition and other intrusive technologies that have been imported from these countries is, we have not imported their laws and accountability mechanisms. The lack of accountability mechanisms with proliferation of these technologies is resulting in various problems, which neither the police establishment nor the political establishment wants to address. These technologies are being abused to do preventive detentions, extra legal surveillance, wrongly target marginalised people and more than anything, they are being experimented on Hyderabadis before they become national systems
Srinivas Kodali is a researcher with interests in cities, data and the internet.
The Baltic states and Poland want to make it easier to sanction the family members and entourage of Russia’s richest men and women but are facing resistance from Hungary, several EU diplomats told POLITICO.
Under its current rules, the EU can freeze the assets and impose visa bans on “leading businesspersons operating in Russia.” Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Poland now want to expand this definition, according to their proposal seen by POLITICO, to include “their immediate family members, or other natural persons, benefitting from them.”
The EU has sanctioned more than 1,400 people in relation to Russia’s activities in Ukraine, many of who are Russian oligarchs. An additional 96 people could be added to the EU’s next sanctions package, draft documents seen by POLITICO indicate. Including oligarchs’ family members and other associates of oligarchs would make it possible to sanctions thousands more people without having to prove that they are directly involved in the war in Ukraine or acting in the economic interest of the Russian state.
This could, for example, apply to the ex-wife of Russian President Vladimir Putin, Lyudmila Ocheretnaya, whose daughters have been sanctioned but has not been herself, and other members of the oligarchs’ entourage.
While some countries had doubts, legal experts are on board, said one of the diplomats.
Yet, in a meeting on Tuesday, at which EU ambassadors discussed the bloc’s next round of sanctions, Hungary resisted such plans, the diplomats said. Budapest argued that this is not part of the 10th sanctions package, said one of the diplomats. Hungary has long been skeptical of including too many names on the list.
Hungary also pushed to strike four people out the already existing sanctions list, two of the diplomats said.
It was not immediately possible to learn the identity of the four individuals.
That request is igniting tensions, and will be likely subject to another heated debate during a meeting of EU ambassadors on Wednesday. During that meeting, they will not only discuss the new package of sanctions against Russia, but also the so-called rollover of the 1,400-plus names already on the list to keep them sanctioned.
That’s because the regime is subject to a six-month review, which has hitherto been more or less a formality. Now, Hungary is using this extension review as leverage by insisting that four specific people have to be struck from the EU’s existing sanctions list before it will agree to the rollover. If Hungary blocks the rollover and refuses to compromise, all 1,400 people would be de-listed, the two diplomats warned.
One of the diplomats didn’t hide his frustration: “It shows Hungary’s disregard for unity and European values that they are willing to risk this in the week where we commemorate one year since the Russian invasion,” he said.
And those aren’t the only measure that Hungary takes issue with. It also is chiefly against sanctioning personnel working in the nuclear sector.
But a Hungarian official poured water on this last point, saying that “the only open issue for Hungary is with the length of the rollover and not with the listings.”
On the oligarchs issue and the proposal of the Baltics and Poland, the same Hungarian official said that this is not part of the 10th package.
As all EU countries have to agree to the proposal, any country could veto the move even if all other 26 EU countries were in favor. Time is running out, with the EU wanting to adopt the 10th sanctions package before the one-year anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on Friday.
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( With inputs from : www.politico.eu )
“I woke at 5 o’clock,” the Estonian prime minister recalled recently. The phone was ringing. Her Lithuanian counterpart was on the line.
“Oh my God, it’s really happening,” came the ominous words, according to Kallas. Another call came in. This time it was the Latvian prime minister.
It was February 24, 2022. War had begun on the European continent.
The night before, Kallas had told her Cabinet members to keep their phones on overnight in anticipation of just this moment: Russia was blitzing Ukraine in an attempt to decapitate the government and seize the country. For those in Estonia and its Baltic neighbors, where memories of Soviet occupation linger, the first images of war tapped into a national terror.
“I went to bed hoping that I was not right,” Kallas said.
Across Europe, similar wakeup calls were rolling in. Russian tanks were barreling into Ukraine and missiles were piercing the early morning sky. In recent weeks, POLITICO spoke with prime ministers, high-ranking EU and NATO officials, foreign ministers and diplomats — nearly 20 in total — to reflect on the war’s early days as it reaches its ruinous one-year mark on Friday. All described a similar foreboding that morning, a sense that the world had irrevocably changed.
Within a year, the Russian invasion would profoundly reshape Europe, upending traditional foreign policy presumptions, cleaving it from Russian energy and reawakening long-dormant arguments about extending the EU eastward.
But for those centrally involved in the war’s buildup, the events of February 24 are still seared in their memories.
In an interview with POLITICO, Charles Michel — head of the European Council, the EU body comprising all 27 national leaders — recalled how he received a call directly from Kyiv as the attacks began.
“I was woken up by Zelenskyy,” Michel recounted. It was around 3 a.m. The Ukrainian president told Michel: “The aggression had started and that it was a full-scale invasion.”
Michel hit the phones, speaking to prime ministers across the EU throughout the night.
Ursula von der Leyen and Josep Borrell speak to the press on February 24, 2022 | Kenzo Tribouillard/AFP via Getty Images
By 5 a.m., EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell was in his office. Three hours later, he was standing next to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen as the duo made the EU’s first major public statement about the dawning war. Von der Leyen then convened the 27 commissioners overseeing EU policy for an emergency meeting.
Elsewhere in Brussels, NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg was on the phone with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, who were six hours behind in Washington, D.C. He then raced over to NATO headquarters, where he urgently gathered the military alliance’s decision-making body.
The mood that morning, Stoltenberg recalled in a recent conversation with reporters, was “serious” but “measured and well-organized.”
In Ukraine, missiles had begun raining down in Kyiv, Odesa and Mariupol. Volodymyr Zelenskyy took to social media, confirming in a video that war had begun. He urged Ukrainians to stay calm.
These video updates would soon become a regular feature of Zelenskyy’s wartime leadership. But this first one was especially jarring — a message from a president whose life, whose country, was now at risk.
It would be one of the last times the Ukrainian president, dressed in a dove-gray suit jacket and crisp white shirt, appeared in civilian clothes.
Europe’s 21st-century Munich moment
February 24, 2022 is an indelible memory for those who lived through it. For many, however, it felt inevitable.
Five days before the invasion, Zelenskyy traveled to the Munich Security Conference, an annual powwow of defense and security experts frequented by senior politicians.
It was here that the Ukrainian leader made one final, desperate plea for more weapons and more sanctions, hitting out at Germany for promising helmets and chiding NATO countries for not doing enough.
“What are you waiting for?” he implored in the highly charged atmosphere in the Bayerischer Hof hotel. “We don’t need sanctions after bombardment happens, after we have no borders, no economy. Why would we need those sanctions then?”
Five days before the invasion, Zelenskyy traveled to the Munich Security Conference, where he made one final, desperate plea for more weapons and more sanctions | Pool photo by Ronald Wittek/Getty Images
The symbolism was rife — Munich, a city forever associated with appeasement following Neville Chamberlain’s ill-fated attempt to swap land for peace with Adolf Hitler in 1938, was now the setting for Zelenskyy’s last appeal to the West.
Zelenskyy, never missing a moment, seized the historical analogy.
“Has our world completely forgotten the mistakes of the 20th century?” he asked. “Where does appeasement policy usually lead to?”
But his calls for more arms were ignored, even as countries began ordering their citizens to evacuate and airlines began canceling flights in and out of the country.
A few days later, Zelenskyy’s warnings were coming true. On February 22, Vladimir Putin inched closer to war, recognizing the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic in eastern Ukraine. It was a decisive moment for the Russian president, paving the way for his all-out assault less than 48 hours later.
The EU responded the next day — its first major action against Moscow’s activities in Ukraine since the escalation of tensions in 2021. Officials unveiled the first in what would be nine sanction packages against Russia (and counting).
In an equally significant move, a reluctant Germany finally pulled the plug on Nord Stream 2, the yet unopened gas pipeline linking Russia to northern Germany — the decision, made after months of pressure, presaged how the Russian invasion would soon upend the way Europeans powered their lives and heated their homes.
Summit showdown
As it happened, EU leaders were already scheduled to meet in Brussels on February 24, the day the invasion began. Charles Michel had summoned the leaders earlier that week to deal with the escalating crisis, and to sign off on the sanctions.
Throughout the afternoon, Brussels was abuzz — TV cameras from around the world had descended on the European quarter. Helicopters circled above.
Suddenly, the regular European Council meeting of EU leaders, oftena forum for technical document drafting as much as political decision-making, had become hugely consequential. With war unfolding, the world was looking at the EU to respond — and lead.
European leaders gathered in Brussels following the invasion | Pool photo by Olivier Hoslet/AFP via Getty Images
The meeting was scheduled to begin at 8 p.m. As leaders were gathering, news came that Russia had seized the Chernobyl nuclear plant, Moldova had declared a state of emergency and thousands of people were pouring out of Ukraine. Later that night, Zelenskyy announced a general mobilization:every man between the ages of 18 and 60 was being asked to fight.
Many leaders were wearing facemasks, a reminder that another crisis, which now seemed to pale in comparison, was still ever-present.
Just before joining colleagues at the Europa building in Brussels, Emmanuel Macron phoned Putin — the French president’s latest effort to mediate with the Russian leader. Macron had visited Moscow on February 7 but left empty-handed after five hours of discussions. He later said he made the call at Zelenskyy’s request, to ask Putin to stop the war.
“It did not produce any results,” Macron said of the call. “The Russian president has chosen war.”
Arriving at the summit, Latvian Prime Minister Krišjānis Kariņš captured the gravity of the moment. “Europe is experiencing the biggest military invasion since the Second World War,” he said. “Our response has to be united.”
But inside the room, divisions were on full display. How far, leaders wondered, could Europe go in sanctioning Russia, given the potential economic blowback? Countries dug in along fault lines that would become familiar in the succeeding months.
The realities of war soon pierced the academic debates. Zelenskyy’s team had set up a video link as missile strikes encircled the capital city, wanting to get the president talking to his EU counterparts.
One person present in the room recalled the percolating anxiety as the video feed beamed through — the image out of focus, the camera shaky. Then the picture sharpened and Zelenskyy appeared, dressed in a khaki shirt and looking deathly pale. His surroundings were faceless, an unknown room somewhere in Kyiv.
“Everyone was silent, the atmosphere was completely tense,” said the official who requested anonymity to speak freely.
Zelenskyy, shaken and utterly focused, told leaders that they may not see him again — the Kremlin wanted him dead.
“If you, EU leaders and leaders of the free world, do not really help Ukraine today, tomorrow the war will also knock at your door,” he warned, invoking an argument he would return to again and again: that this wasn’t just Ukraine’s war — it was Europe’s war.
Black smoke rises from a military airport in Chuguyev near Kharkiv on February 24, 2022 | Aris Messinis/AFP via Getty Images
Within hours, EU leaders had signed off on their second package of pre-prepared sanctions hitting Russia. But a fractious debate had already begun about what should come next.
The Baltic nations and Poland wanted more — more penalties, more economic punishments. Others were holding back. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi aired their reluctance about expelling Russian banks from the global SWIFT payment system. It was needed to pay for Russian gas, after all.
How quickly that would change.
Sanctions were not the only pressing matter. There was a humanitarian crisis unfolding on Europe’s doorstep. The EU had to both get aid into a war zone and prepare for a mass exodus of people fleeing it.
Janez Lenarčič, the EU’s crisis management commissioner, landed in Paris on the day of the invasion, returning from Niger. Officials started making plans to get ambulances, generators and medicine into Ukraine — ultimately comprising 85,000 tons of aid.
“The most complex, biggest and longest-ever operation” of its kind for the EU, he said.
By that weekend, there was also a plan for the refugees escaping Russian bombs. At a rare Sunday meeting, ministers agreed to welcome and distribute the escaping Ukrainians — a feat that has long eluded the EU for other migrants. Days later, they would grant Ukrainians the instant right to live and work in the EU — another first in an extraordinary time. Decisions that normally took years were now flying through in hours.
Looming over everything were Ukraine’s repeated — and increasingly dire — entreaties for more weapons. Europe’s military investments had lapsed in recent decades, and World War II still cast a dark shadow over countries like Germany, where the idea of sending arms to a warzone still felt verboten.
There were also quiet doubts (not to mention intelligence assessments). Would Ukraine even have its own government next week? Why risk war with Russia if it was days away from toppling Kyiv?
“What we didn’t know at that point was that the Ukrainian resistance would be so successful,” a senior NATO diplomat told POLITICO on condition of anonymity. “We were thinking there would be a change of regime [in Kyiv], what do we do?”
That, too, was all about to change.
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz addressed Germany on the night of Russia’s invasion | Pool photo by Hannibal Hanschke/Getty Images
By the weekend, Germany had sloughed off its reluctance, slowly warming to its role as a key military player. The EU, too, dipped its toe into historic waters that weekend, agreeing to help reimburse countries sending weapons to Ukraine — another startling first for a self-proclaimed peace project.
“I remember, saying, ‘OK, now we go for it,’” said Stefano Sannino, secretary-general of the EU’s diplomatic arm.
Ironically, the EU would refund countries using the so-called European Peace Facility — a little-known fund that was suddenly the EU’s main vehicle to support lethal arms going to a warzone.
Over at NATO, the alliance activated its defense plans and sent extra forces to the alliance’s eastern flank. The mission had two tracks, Stoltenberg recounted — “to support Ukraine, but also prevent escalation beyond Ukraine.”
Treading that fine line would become the defining balancing act over the coming year for the Western allies as they blew through one taboo after another.
Who knew what, when
As those dramatic, heady early days fade into history, Europeans are now grappling with what the war means — for their identity, for their sense of security and for the European Union that binds them together.
The invasion has rattled the core tenets underlying the European project, said Ivan Krastev, a prominent political scientist who has long studied Europe’s place in the world.
“For different reasons, many Europeans believed that this is a post-war Continent,” he said.
Post-World War II Europe was built on the assumption that open economic policies, trade between neighbors and mild military power would preserve peace.
“For the Europeans to accept the possibility of the war was basically to accept the limits of our own model,” Krastev argued.
Ukrainian refugees gather and rest upon their arrival at the main railway station in Berlin | Odd Andersen/AFP via Getty Images
The disbelief has bred self-reflection: Has the war permanently changed the EU? Will a generation that had confined memories of World War II and the Cold War to the past view the next conflict differently?
And, perhaps most acutely, did Europe miss the signs?
“The start of that war has changed our lives, that’s for sure,” said Romanian Foreign Minister Bogdan Aurescu. It wasn’t, however, unexpected, he argued. “We are very attentive to what happens in our region,” he said. “The signs were quite clear.”
Aurescu pointed back to April 2021 as the moment he knew: “It was quite clear that Russia was preparing an aggression against Ukraine.”
Not everyone in Europe shared that assessment, though — to the degree that U.S. officials became worried. They started a public and private campaign in 2021 to warn Europe of an imminent invasion as Russia massed its troops on the Ukrainian border.
In November 2021, von der Leyen made her first trip to the White House. She sat down with Joe Biden in the Oval Office, surrounded by a coterie of national security and intelligence officials. Biden had just received a briefing before the gathering on the Russia battalion buildup and wanted to sound the alarm.
“The president was very concerned,” said one European official, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive conversations. “This was a time when no one in Europe was paying any attention, even the intelligence services.”
But others disputed the narrative that Europe was unprepared as America sounded the alarm.
“It’s a question of perspective. You can see the same information, but come to a different conclusion,” said one senior EU official involved in discussions in the runup to the war, while conceding that the U.S. and U.K. — both members of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance — did have better information.
Even if those sounding the alarm proved right, said Pierre Vimont, a former secretary-general of the EU’s diplomatic wing and Macron’s Russia envoy until the war broke out, it was hard to know in advance what, exactly, to plan for.
“What type of military operation would it be?” he recalled people debating. A limited operation in the east? A full occupation? A surgical strike on Kyiv?
Here’s where most landed: Russia’s onslaught was horrifying — its brutality staggering. But the signs had been there. Something was going to happen.
“We knew that the invasion is going to happen, and we had shared intelligence,” Stoltenberg stressed. “Of course, until the planes are flying and the battle tanks are rolling, and the soldiers are marching, you can always change your plans. But the more we approached the 24th of February last year, the more obvious it was.”
Then on the day, he recounted, it was a matter of dutifully enacting the plan: “We were prepared, we knew exactly what to do.”
“You may be shocked by this invasion,” he added, “but you cannot be surprised.”
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( With inputs from : www.politico.eu )
BRUSSELS — China’s attempt to style itself as a neutral peacemaker in the Ukraine war fell flat on Friday when NATO and the EU both slammed its playbook for ending the conflict one year after Russia’s full-scale invasion.
Beijing is a key strategic ally of Russia, which it sees as a useful partner against the West and NATO. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Chinese companies are already supplying “non-lethal” aid to Russia, but added there are indications that China is weighing up sending arms — something Beijing denies.
Earlier on Friday, the Chinese foreign ministry published a 12-point, 892-word “position paper” with a view to settling what it calls the “Ukraine crisis,” without referring to it as a war.
“China’s position builds on a misplaced focus on the so-called ‘legitimate security interests and concerns’ of parties, implying a justification for Russia’s illegal invasion, and blurring the roles of the aggressor and the aggressed,” Nabila Massrali, the EU’s foreign policy spokeswoman, said in a press briefing.
“The position paper doesn’t take into account who is the aggressor and who is the victim of an illegal and unjustified war of aggression,” Massrali, said, calling the Chinese position paper “selective and insufficient about their implications for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.”
Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, said China’s stance was anything but neutral.
“It is not a peace plan but principles that they shared. You have to see them against a specific backdrop. And that is the backdrop that China has taken sides, by signing for example an unlimited friendship right before Russia’s invasion in Ukraine started,” she said at a press conference in Estonia. “So we will look at the principles, of course. But we will look at them against the backdrop that China has taken sides.”
NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg also joined officials in pouring cold water on Beijing.
“China doesn’t have much credibility,” he told reporters on Friday, responding to the latest official document. “They have not been able to condemn the illegal invasion of Ukraine.”
Stoltenberg added that there have been “signs and indications that China may be planning and considering to supply military aid to Russia,” although NATO has not seen “any actual delivery of lethal aid.”
China has been hoping to improve ties with the Europeans, as it doubles down on efforts to discredit the U.S.
Assistant Foreign Minister Hua Chunying, for instance, accused the U.S. of benefiting from the war. Wang Lutong, the head of European affairs at the Chinese Foreign Ministry, appealed directly to the European Union: “China is willing to make joint efforts with the EU and continue to play a constructive role on Ukraine,” Wang said in a tweet, adding a screenshot of the latest proposal.
More doubts
Merely five lines into China’s newly unveiled official plan on resolving the “Ukraine crisis” — released on Friday marking the first-year point of what Beijing studiously refuses to call a war — Russian propaganda appears.
“The security of a region should not be achieved by strengthening or expanding military blocs,” the Chinese foreign ministry position paper reads, supporting the Russian claim that war broke out in order to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO.
The next point in the Chinese plan: “All parties must … avoid fanning the flames and aggravating tensions.” Chinese diplomats have in recent weeks accused the U.S. of being the biggest arms supplier for Ukraine, while it faces mounting pressure not to provide Russia with weapons.
Oleksandr Merezhko, chair of the Ukrainian parliament’s foreign affairs committee, called China’s position “hypocritical.”
“[China’s proposal] is very reminiscent of the hypocritical Soviet rhetoric of ‘fight for peace,’” said Merezhko. “It’s a set of declarative empty slogans; it’s not backed by specifics or an implementation mechanism.”
Paramedics carry an injured Ukrainian serviceman who stepped on an anti-personnel land mine | Yasuyoshi Chiba/AFP via Getty Images
Merezhko also asked Europe not to fall for China’s charm offensive as it seeks to split the transatlantic unity on assisting his country. “China, just like Russia, is trying to split the EU and the U.S. and to undermine transatlantic solidarity,” he told POLITICO in response to the Chinese proposal. “It’s very dangerous.”
Central and Eastern European countries, the most vocal supporters of arming Ukraine further, are equally dismissive of Beijing’s rhetoric.
“China’s plan is vague and does not offer solutions,” Ivana Karásková, who heads the China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe think tank based in Prague. “The plan calls on Russia and Ukraine to deal with the issue themselves, which would only benefit Russia; China continues to oppose what it calls unilateral sanctions and asks for the sanctions to be approved by the UN Security Council — well, given the fact that the aggressor is a permanent UNSC member with a veto right, this claim is beyond ridiculous.”
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( With inputs from : www.politico.eu )
MUNICH — NATO’s eastern flank has found its voice — but Joe Biden’s visit is a reminder that Western capitals still have the weight.
After Russia bombed its way into Ukraine, the military alliance’s eastern members won praise for their prescient warnings (not to mention a few apologies). They garnered respect for quickly emptying their weapons stockpiles for Kyiv and boosting defense spending to new heights. Now, they’re driving the conversation on how to deal with Russia.
In short, eastern countries suddenly have the ear of traditional Western powers — and they are trying to move the needle.
“We draw the red line, then we waste the time, then we cross this red line,” Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda said over the weekend at the Munich Security Conference, describing a now-familiar cycle of debates among Ukraine’s partners as eastern capitals push others to move faster.
The region’s sudden prominence will be on full display as U.S. President Joe Biden travels to Poland this week, where he will sit down with leaders of the so-called Bucharest Nine — Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia.
The choice is both symbolic and practical. Washington is keen to show its eastern partners it wants their input — and to remind Vladimir Putin of the consequences should the Kremlin leader spread his war into NATO territory.
Yet when it comes to allies’ most contentious decisions, like what arms to place where, the eastern leaders ultimately still have to defer to leaders like Biden — and his colleagues in Western powers like Germany. They are the ones holding the largest quantities of modern tanks, fighter jets and long-range missiles, after all.
“My job,” Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki said in Munich, is “to move the pendulum of imagination of my partners in western Europe.”
“Our region has risen in relevance,” added Czech Foreign Minister Jan Lipavský in an interview. But Western countries are still “much stronger” on the economic and military front, he added. “They are still the backbone.”
They’re listening … now
When Latvian Defense Minister Ināra Mūrniece entered politics over a decade ago, she recalled the skepticism that greeted her and like-minded countries when they discussed Russia on the global stage.
“They didn’t understand us,” she said in an interview earlier this month. People saw the region as “escalating the picture,” she added.
Latvian Defense Minister Ināra Mūrniece | Gints Ivuskans/AFP via Getty Images
February 24, 2022, changed things. The images of Russia rolling tanks and troops into Ukraine shocked many Westerners — and started changing minds. The Russian atrocities that came shortly after in places like Bucha and Irpin were “another turning point,” Mūrniece said.
Now, the eastern flank plays a key role in defining the alliance’s narrative — and its understanding of Russia.
“Our voice is now louder and more heard,” said Romanian Foreign Minister Bogdan Aurescu.
The Bucharest Nine — an informal format that brings together the region for dialogue with the U.S. and occasionally other partners — is one of the vehicles regional governments are using to showcase their interests.
“It has become an authoritative voice in terms of assessment of the security situation, in terms of assessment of needs,” Aurescu said in an interview in Munich. NATO is listening to the group for a simple reason, he noted: “The security threats are coming from this part of our neighborhood.”
Power shifts … slowly
While the eastern flank has prodded its western partners to send once-unthinkable weapons to Ukraine, the power balance has not completely flipped. Far from it.
Washington officials retain the most sway in the Western alliance. Behind them, several western European capitals take the lead.
“Without the Germans things don’t move — without the Americans things don’t move for sure,” said one senior western European diplomat, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they are not authorized to speak publicly.
And at this stage of the war, as Ukraine pushes for donations of the most modern weapons — fighter jets, advanced tanks, longer-range missile systems — it’s the alliance’s largest economies and populations that are in focus.
“It’s very easy for me to say that, ‘Of course, give fighter jets’ — I don’t have them,” Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas told reporters earlier this month.
Asked if his country would supply Kyiv with F-16 fighter jets, Morawiecki conceded in Munich, “we have not too many of them.” | Omar Marques/Getty Images
“So it’s up to those countries to say who have,” she said. “If I would have, I would give — but I don’t.”
And even some eastern countries who have jets don’t want to move without their Western counterparts.
Asked if his country would supply Kyiv with F-16 fighter jets, Morawiecki conceded in Munich, “we have not too many of them.” He did say, however, that Poland could offer older jets — if the allies could pull together a coalition, that is.
Another challenge for advocates of a powerful eastern voice within NATO is that the eastern flank itself is diverse.
Priorities vary even among like-minded countries based on their geographies. And, notably, there are some Russia-friendly outliers.
Hungary, for example, does not provide any weapons assistance to Ukraine and continues to maintain a relationship with the Kremlin. In fact, Budapest has become so isolated in Western policy circles that no Hungarian government officials attended the Munich Security Conference.
“I think the biggest problem in Hungary is the rhetoric of leadership, which sometimes really crosses the red line,” said the Czech Republic’s Lipavský, who was cautious to add that Budapest does fulfill NATO obligations, participating in alliance defense efforts.
Just for now?
There are also questions about whether the east’s moment in the limelight is a permanent fixture or product of the moment. After all, China, not Russia, may be seizing western attention in the future.
“It’s obvious that their voice is becoming louder, but that’s also a consequence of the geopolitical situation we’re in,” said the senior western European diplomat. “I’m not sure if it’s sustainable in the long run.”
A second senior western European diplomat, who also spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive internal alliance dynamics, said that the eastern flank countries sometimes take a tough tone “because of the fear of the pivot to China.”
NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has also reiterated that western alliance members play a role in defending the eastern flank | Johannes Simon/Getty Images
Asked if the war has changed the balance of influence within the alliance, French Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna said: “Yes and no.”
“We have to defend our territories, it is as simple as that,” she told POLITICO in Munich. “In order to do so we had to reinforce the eastern flank — Russia is on that part of the continent.”
NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has also reiterated that western alliance members play a role in defending the eastern flank.
Asked whether NATO’s center of gravity is shifting east, he said on a panel in Munich that “what has shifted east is NATO’s presence.”
But, he added, “of course many of those troops come from the western part of the alliance — so this demonstrates how NATO is together and how we support each other.”
And in western Europe, there is a sense that the east does deserve attention at the moment.
“They might not have all the might,” said the second senior western European diplomat. “But they deserve solidarity.”
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( With inputs from : www.politico.eu )
With war raging in Europe, the race to find NATO’s next chief is on.
Jens Stoltenberg was a steady hand as Western capitals rushed to help Ukraine push back invading Russian troops. But as his term expires in September, speculation is growing over who might succeed him.
Could it be a woman? Someone from Eastern Europe?
Moscow’s war greatly complicates the decision, which requires consensus among the leaders of NATO’s 30 member countries.
The next secretary-general must play a tough balancing act in encouraging capitals to continue supplying weapons to Ukraine and building up NATO’s own defenses — all while formally staying out of the conflict. Few pass muster for this highly sensitive role.
The “overall feeling,” said one senior NATO diplomat, is that it is “time for fresh air.”
But the allies may end up playing it safe after all, and sticking with Stoltenberg.
The Stoltenberg card
A senior European diplomat summed up the buzz around names in three tiers, ranked by intensity of chatter.
An extension of Stoltenberg’s term is the most-mentioned option.
A second tier includes Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte, Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas and British Defense Secretary Ben Wallace.
A third group of less frequently mentioned names, the diplomat said, consists of Lithuanian Prime Minister Ingrida Šimonytė, Slovakia’s President Zuzana Čaputová and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen of Germany.
Jens Stoltenberg was a steady hand as Western capitals rushed to help Ukraine push back invading Russian troops. But as his term expires in September, speculation is growing over who might succeed him | Valeria Mongell/AFP via Getty Images
Since all of NATO’s secretaries-general have thus far been male, there is pressure within the ranks to appoint a woman.
“Time for a female Sec Gen,” said the senior NATO diplomat. “If men try to hold their positions forever, fair representation of women will never have a chance.”
And some allies have pushed for more regional diversity. Stoltenberg, who has held the job since 2014, is a former Norwegian prime minister. His most recent predecessors were Danish, Dutch and British.
The current secretary-general’s term was quickly extended last March after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Many officials now believe that another extension for Stoltenberg, even if short, is a serious possibility.
The longtime leader is seen as a safe pair of hands. Despite some delegations preferring to see a fresh face soon, Stoltenberg is still perceived as a rare senior official who can keep his cool — and stick to the script — in even the gravest of crises.
“Stoltenberg wants to stay,” said the senior NATO diplomat.
But giving Stoltenberg a short extension could make a future replacement decision collide with the EU’s own top jobs competition in 2024, not to mention the upcoming U.S. presidential election — an outcome some allies would prefer to avoid.
A NATO spokesperson declined to elaborate on Stoltenberg’s future aspirations. Asked in December about the issue, the current secretary-general told the BBC: “My focus now is on my responsibilities.”
“I don’t speculate,” he added, “about what will happen after my tenure.”
The eastern front
Some see candidates from Eastern Europe as particularly suitable.
Already before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, there was momentum for the alliance to select a secretary-general from the east. Some officials in the region argue that the war has since strengthened the case for someone from a country like Estonia or Lithuania.
Slovakia’s Zuzana Čaputová ticks both boxes as a female eastern candidate, though her name is mentioned less often in alliance circles | Pool photo by Adrian Dennis/Getty Images
“For years, the countries of the eastern flank have been warning about Russia’s threat,” said an official from the Baltics.
The region’s countries, the Baltic official said, were front-runners in boosting military spending and pushing the alliance to improve its defenses.
“It would be very logical and sobering,” the official continued, “to have someone who is experienced in dealing with Russia and who understands Russia’s logic and mentality, to lead the North Atlantic Alliance.”
Slovakia’s Čaputová ticks both boxes as a female eastern candidate, though her name is mentioned less often in alliance circles.
A spokesperson for Čaputová said she was focused on her current job, but said the possibility of a Slovak being floated for the NATO post was “a strong reflection of our foreign and security decisions.”
Some western capitals, however, would not support such candidates at the moment, seeing the alliance’s east — and the Baltic states in particular — as too hawkish when war is raging next door.
Estonia’s Kallas herself has played down expectations, telling local media in November that “the likelihood of an offer like this being made” is “extremely low.”
The Western option
Western NATO countries are for some allies a reliable fallback source for possible leadership.
Wallace, Britain’s defense secretary, is well respected and has previously said that NATO would be a “nice job.” However, numerous European capitals — in particular Paris — are expected to object to a London name and insist on an EU candidate.
One possible compromise being floated in Brussels is yet another secretary-general from the Netherlands. Dutch politicians have traditionally been a popular choice for the role, previously holding the post for three terms covering 21 years in the past six decades.
The Dutch are seen as serious on defense but not as hawkish as the Baltics — and the names of current Prime Minister Rutte, Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Sigrid Kaag and Defense Minister Kajsa Ollongren are all circulating as possible candidates.
Asked about the speculation, Rutte said he wanted to “leave politics altogether and do something completely different.” The two Dutch ministers did not express interest in the job.
Commission President von der Leyen, a former German defense minister, is a female candidate who could gain support from western capitals nervous about the prospect of a leader from the eastern flank, but it’s unclear whether she is interested in the role. “We never comment on such speculations,” said a Commission spokesperson.
Although her reputation in security circles is mixed, von der Leyen is seen as a strong possible candidate regardless — if the timing aligns and she does not get a second term as European Commission president.
Other female politicians floated include Canada’s widely respected Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland and Foreign Minister Mélanie Joly. Nevertheless, officials say, as the alliance focuses on boosting its defenses, Ottawa’s low defense spending and non-European status mean that a Canadian is unlikely to get the job.
Amid all the speculation, some within the alliance dismiss the breathless names game.
“This is more a basket of names that came to anybody’s mind,” said a second senior European diplomat, adding: “My guess: Stoltenberg.”
Jacopo Barigazzi and Cristina Gallardo contributed reporting.
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( With inputs from : www.politico.eu )
